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Lea Brilmayer-
One is hard put to find a serious discussion of "rights" in the current
academic literature or judicial discussions of choice of law. With a few
notable exceptions, the academic talk is all about "policies," or "inter-
ests," or "functional analysis."' Even in leading constitutional decisions,
the validity of the state's claim to apply its own law is measured primarily
in terms of the adequacy of its interest in having its law applied, ap-
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and Russell Weintraub.
1. Three notable exceptions are Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness, " and Choice of Law, 96 YALE
L.J. 1191 (1987), Kogan, Toward a Jurisprudence of Choice of Law: The Priority of Fairness over
Comity, 62 N.Y.U.L. REV. 651 (1987), and Maltz, Visions of Fairness-The Relationship Between
Jurisdiction and Choice-of-Law, 30 ARIz. L. REv. 751 (1988). Of course, there is also a large litera-
ture criticizing the "interest" or "policy" approach. See, e.g., Ely, Choice of Law and the State's
Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 173 (1981).
In addition, a growing academic literature discusses fairness in the context of personal jurisdiction,
where similar concepts of "purposefulness," "fairness," and "state sovereignty" are important. See,
e.g., Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65
TEx. L. REV. 689 (1987); Stewart, A New Litany of Personal Jurisdiction, 60 COLo. L. REv. 5
(1989).
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praised in light of the contacts between the state and the controversy.'
Talking about rights is like talking about perpetual motion machines,
phlogiston, or faeries. "[O]ne may now wonder," wrote David Cavers in
his seminal article A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, "how any
juristic construct such as 'right' could have been accepted as fundamental
in the explanation of any important aspect of judicial activity."3
Are we really ready to consign "rights" to the intellectual dustbin of
history? Surely in other areas of law many of us continue, despite Cavers'
admonition, to discuss legal problems in terms of the parties' rights. We
talk about free speech rights, property rights, and the right to equal pro-
tection. Some of these rights are constitutional rights, but others, like
property rights, are also granted by statute or recognized by common
law.4 We argue, in addition, about what rights exist as a matter of nor-
mative theory, and proponents of particular rights attempt to secure them
institutional recognition. What then accounts for the peculiar reticence of
conflicts scholars when the topic "rights" is raised? Is their unwillingness
to recognize and enforce rights intellectually defensible? And does this
choice of phrasing make any difference at the bottom line-when the deci-
sion is made, in other words, to apply one state's law rather than
another's?
There is more at stake than semantics. Choosing to talk in terms of
rights rather than policies or interests represents a fundamental jurispru-
dential commitment which is reflected in the way that concrete problems
are resolved. Rights arise primarily in deontological ethical theories while
policies and interests are instrumental or consequentialist.5 Rights impose
limits on state authority, protecting individuals from being forced to sacri-
fice for the good of society as a whole. They reflect a notion of individual
desert that stands above the instrumental advantage to be achieved by the
application of some particular state's substantive law.
The adoption of the modern "policy" terminology came at a point when
legal realism was on the rise and legal formalism on the way out.6 Several
of the academics who launched the general legal realist movement were
also involved in setting the stage for the choice of law revolution that
2. In particular, see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981) (plurality opinion)
("significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair"). See also B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 188-282 (1963) (discussing constitutional decisions that speak in terms of interests). The cases
do mention fairness, however, even while avoiding the term "rights." See, e.g., Allstate, 449 U.S. at
313 (plurality opinion), 449 U.S. at 333 (dissenting opinion); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797 (1985) (discussing fairness).
3. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 175-76 (1933),
reprinted in D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS, 1933-1983, at 3, 7 (1985).
4. This is particularly clear in the context of the so-called "new property." Reich, The New Prop-
erty, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 43-46 (comparing deontological theories with consequential-
ist theories).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 18-27.
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Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law
culminated in Brainerd Currie's work in the 1950's and 1960's. This
modern revolution discredited the vested rights approach of Joseph Beale
and the First Restatement of Conflicts and offered in its stead a functional
theory by which states were advised to further their own interests and
substantive policies. The only courts continuing to speak in terms of
"rights" are those that still apply the First Restatement, either because of
inertia or out of some sense that its replacement is inadequate.7 Scholars,
by and large, scorn such backward judges.'
It does not have to be this way. It is wrong to treat the word "rights" as
the sole province of vested rights theorists such as Joseph Beale. There are
other conceptions of rights which are more consistent with modern legal
thinking, and more appropriate to choice of law analysis. Even a cursory
look at the philosophical and jurisprudential literature will show that the
policy theorists' understanding of what "rights" must mean is cramped
and dismissive. Admittedly, even the most developed theories of rights are
likely to have controversial aspects-but what jurisprudential system does
not? We should not reject a rights-based approach to choice of law with-
out first trying to discover what the best possible rights-based theory
might have to offer.
This article sets out to do exactly that: to outline the most plausible
rights-based approach to choice of law. It will not argue that rights analy-
sis by itself will solve all choice of law problems. Rights analysis only
establishes what Robert Nozick has called "side constraints," namely
principled limits, based on fairness, on what the state may do.' It may
turn out that in numerous instances there are several different states
whose law might apply without violating the parties' rights. In such cases,
policy analysis could properly come into play."0 The new rights-based
analysis of choice of law thus resembles traditional approaches to personal
jurisdiction, where any one of several states might act as a permissible
forum.
In this respect, the new rights-based analysis differs from the Bealean
vested rights approach, which purported to uniquely determine answers to
all choice of law questions. This new analysis is different in other impor-
tant respects. For one thing, the rights are primarily negative rights rather
7. A current listing of which states follow the various theories can be found in Kay, Theory into
Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REV. 521 (1983). For an empirical analysis of
the factors accounting for change, see M. Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of
Law (1988) (unpublished manuscript).
8. Currie wrote that "Walter Wheeler Cook discredited the vested-rights theory as thoroughly as
the intellect of one man can ever discredit the intellectual product of another." B. CURRIE, supra note
2, at 6. Apparently the only scholar willing to mount even a partial defense of the foundations of the
vested rights theory is Dane, supra note 1. The First Restatement's approach has been abandoned
even by the American Law Institute in its RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
9. R. NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 29 (1974).
10. This is not to say that the modem theorists' account of what state policy requires is adequate.
For criticism of their view of state policy, see Ely, supra note 1; articles cited infra note 35.
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than positive rights; not swords, but shields. 1 By and large, they are
rights to be left alone. Their source is also different from the sources that
Beale relied upon. They are founded on principles of political fairness
that specify the preconditions for the exercise of legitimate state coercion.
The rights-based approach applies a model of political rights in the inter-
state setting.
There are two aspects of this rights-based approach. The first is an
argument that rights are important to choice of law analysis; the second is
an argument about what rights there are. These two aspects of the theory
are separable. One might be convinced by the meta-theoretical arguments
below that rights matter because political fairness requires recognition of
the rights of individuals, yet disagree about the content of the particular
principles of political fairness and the "side constraints" that would be
generated. One might agree, in fact, about the general importance of polit-
ical fairness in the abstract without even having a clear idea of what polit-
ical fairness might require. Conversely, one might be more wedded to
one's own conceptions of political fairness than to any meta-theoretical
concept of the importance of rights or fairness generally. This article at-
tempts both to argue in favor of a general theory about why rights matter
and to set out some basic principles, consistent with commonly held no-
tions of political fairness, about what rights there are.
The distinctive nature of this political rights-based approach is best ap-
preciated by contrasting it with both the Bealean vested rights theory and
the policy-oriented approach that is currently in vogue. For this reason,
we start with a discussion of the debate between the vested rights theorists
and the policy theorists. This jurisprudential background will set the stage
for the development of a new approach to rights in choice of law, one that
rests on assumptions of political and moral philosophy rather than formal-
ist jurisprudence. After explaining why a political rights-based approach
provides a suitable foundation for constraints on a policy-based analysis of
choice of law, the second half of this article spells out some basic features
of the choice of law regime to which a theory of political rights could give
rise.
11. The discussion below addresses two kinds of rights. The first are purely negative rights in the
sense that they specify conditions under which the state may not legitimately coerce an individual. But
we will also discuss fairness based on actuarial balance that specifies how otherwise legitimate power
may be exercised. See infra Part II(C). Even such "mutuality" requirements are negative in the sense
that the state might comply simply by leaving the individual completely alone. Bealean vested rights,
in contrast, are positive rights because the state has an affirmative obligation to act so as to help
people realize their value.
[Vol. 98: 12771280
HeinOnline -- 98 Yale L. J. 1280 1988-1989
0 e ale a r al l. :
t iti ri ts; r s, t i l s.ll y , t
i ts t . ir rce i r t t rces t t
eale y re f e ri ciples f liti l
t if t itions f iti te t te i .
t - s r ach li s l liti l t
t te
re r i ri ts-based . i
t t t i ;
t t re
. t r tical t
l t i ts se liti l ires ti f
i i ls, t t t lar
i l s e i ts" t













1 is i i of . i t r l ti ri t i t
iti i t a t le iti t c r a i i i l. t
i l t t i le iti t
fra II( ). t " i t ar ti i t s s
that t i t i by l t i i i alone. l t rights,
in i ri t the st t a affir ti obli ati t t so
peo l their al .
Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law
I. PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS
A. A Bit of Intellectual History
The history of the modern choice of law revolution has been thoroughly
discussed elsewhere,12 and only a short survey is necessary to highlight
those aspects that are relevant to our new theory of rights. The seminal
rights-based approach was the vested rights theory that Joseph Beale, the
Reporter for the American Law Institute, developed and incorporated into
the First Restatement of Conflicts." Beale's theory of vested rights rested
upon a set of territorial assumptions about the proper geographical scope
of a state's authority. Each state was said to have exclusive authority over
its own territory, and was thought to be utterly without power to affect
property or events in other states. 4
How then, one might ask, could a sovereign state feel confident that its
laws would be respected in the courts of another sovereign state? If the
effect of a state's laws supposedly stopped at its borders, then how could
those laws have any force in the forum which was called upon to adjudi-
cate legal claims arising within the first state? The answer provided by
the First Restatement was that the forum did not really enforce the first
state's laws, as such, but only recognized the rights that were created by
those laws. If certain relevant activities occurred in the first state, then
rights would vest under its laws and these rights would acquire an extra-
territorial effect-a claim for recognition in the courts of another
state-that the laws themselves would not have.'"
Beale's approach won judicial support with well-respected jurists. Jus-
tice Holmes, in particular, was a proponent of this obligatio theory of
jurisdiction, and of territorial approaches to choice of law, as well.16 Car-
dozo described the vested rights approach in a particularly vivid manner
in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.:
A foreign statute is not law in this state, but it gives rise to an obli-
gation, which, if transitory, 'follows the person and may be enforced
wherever the person may be found' . . . 'No law can exist as such
12. General discussions of the history of choice of law can be found in Juenger, A Page of His-
tory, 35 MERCER L. REV. 419 (1984), in L. BRILMAYER, J. CORRE, E. EsiTY, J. FISCH, J. FIRE-
STONE, S. GORDON, J. HUTTONHOWER, N. KUCKES, M. MARR, K. PAISLEY & A. SPENCER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM ch. 7 (1986) [hereinafter L.
BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION], and in Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 772, 802-20 (1983). Discussions of the relation between legal realism and choice of
law are contained in L. KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927-1960 (1986), in particular id. at
20-29 (discussing Cook, Yntema, Lorenzen, and Beale), and in Dane, supra note 1.
13. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
14. 1 J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1.1 (1935); see also J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMEsTIc, §§ 7-8 (7th ed. 1872).
15. L. BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 12, at 218-20.
16. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 547 (1914); Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R.
Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904).
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except the law of the land; but . . . it is a principle of every civilized
law that vested rights shall be protected'. . . . The plaintiff owns
something, and we help him to get it."7
This notion of legal rights created by the substantive law of the place
where the cause of action arose and honored elsewhere should sound fa-
miliar to modern ears. It resembles our current notion of the effect given
to a final judgment outside the state of rendition.
The ink was hardly dry on the Restatement when the critical onslaught
began. Beale of Harvard was hardly a personal favorite of the legal real-
ists, a group then based in New Haven."8
To say that Beale's attempt to reduce the entire field of conflict of
laws to the twin legal principles of territoriality and vested rights
irritated the realists would be an understatement. . . . To [Walter
Wheeler] Cook, the syllogistic reasoning that had led Beale to the
vested rights theory was 'an outrageous bit of nonsense.'...
In his letters [Jerome Frank] referred to Beale as 'the right wing
of the right wing.' He delighted in adjectives such as 'Bealy-
mouthed' and 'ibealistic' . . . as well as in the poetry which Law
and the Modern Mind inspired Thurman Arnold to compose:
Beale, Beale, marvelous Beale
Only in verse can we tell how we feel .
Beale's jurisprudence, clearly, struck a raw nerve.
Why did Beale's jurisprudence bother the legal realists so much, and
what did they propose in its stead? This is no place to discuss the realist
movement generally, but those familiar with its basic principles will find
its choice of law positions unsurprising. The major realist protagonists in
the choice of law field were Cook, Lorenzen, and Yntema.20 Cook's ideas
are probably the best developed of the three, and the most influential for
later choice of law scholars such as David Cavers and Brainerd Currie.2 '
Cook denied that laws of a sovereign state projected out in space only to
be stopped short at the state border.22 More important, he denied the util-
17. 224 N.Y. 99, 110, 120 N.E. 198, 201 (1918).
18. L. KALMAN, supra note 12, at 25.
19. Id. at 25-26.
20. For discussion of these scholars' role in the realist movement, see generally L. KALMAN,
supra note 12. For their views on choice of law, see, for example, W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND
LEGAL BASIS OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942); E. LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAW (1947); Yntema, The Historic Basis of Private International Law, in SELECTED
READINGS ON CONFLICT OF LAW (M. Culp ed. 1956).
21. Both Cavers and Currie extensively cited Cook's work. Cavers lists Lorenzen and Cook as
"the foremost" realist critics of Beale. D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 7 & n.17 (1965).
Currie's view of Cook's work has already been alluded to. See supra note 8.
22. W. COOK, supra note 20, at 41 (" '[L]aw' is not a material phenomenon which spreads out
like a light wave until it reaches the territorial boundary and then stops.").
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Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law
ity of analyzing choice of law problems in terms of the parties' vested
rights.23
To speak in terms of effectuating the parties' vested rights, wrote Cook,
was to court confusion. "We must . . . constantly resist the tendency to
which we are all subject to reify, 'thingify,' or hypostatize 'rights' and
other 'legal relations.' ",24 Cook advised his readers to bear in mind that
the word "rights" was simply shorthand for a prediction of the actual
conduct of judges in deciding the case.2 5 For Cook, there could be no legal
rights until the case was decided.26
'Right,' 'duty,' and other names for 'legal relations' are therefore not
names of objects or entities which have an existence apart from the
behavior of the officials in question, but terms by means of which we
describe to each other what prophecies we make as to the probable
occurrence of a certain sequence of events-the behavior of the
officials.2"
This position raises as many questions as it answers. First, it is not
clear why, for Cook, rights might come into existence once a court had
decided a case. Given the uncertainties present in judgments enforcement,
how could rights come into being before the final judgment was actually
paid? A judicial judgment, after all, amounts to nothing but the sort of
"property-like" entity that Holmes and Cardozo thought was created by
the legal rule itself, a "thing" which could be carried from state to state.
Second, as a descriptive matter, it is far from clear that we actually use
the word "right" in the manner Cook described. His analysis of the term
seems to dismiss entirely the distinctive character of rights-based talk. The
whole point of speaking in terms of rights is to make a normative argu-
ment about how a judge ought to decide a case.
We will return to the notion that people typically refer to "rights" in
order to make a normative argument,28 but first we should ask what the
realists proposed as a replacement for the vested rights theory of conflicts.
Cook himself was not very helpful on this score. At times he seemed to
suggest that the proper approach was simply the "scientific" one of
describing how courts actually decide choice of law cases.29 This would be
consistent with the assertion that the important task of the approach was
23. Even when Cook used the term "rights" he did so very differently than the vested rights
theorists. See, e.g., id. at 33 (there are as many sets of rights as jurisdictions that might afford relief;
court does not enforce foreign rights but ones created by local law).
24. Id. at 30.
25. Id. at 29-31.
26. Id. at 59.
27. Id. at 30.
28. See infra note 53 and accompanying text; infra Part I(C) (to make rights-based argument is
to make normative claim that judge or legislator ought to honor right in question).
29. See, e.g., W. CooK, supra note 20, at 29.
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prophesying case outcomes. This approach also aspired, in a supposedly
scientific manner, to avoid the injection of the theorist's own value judg-
ments. This proposal alone, however, would not have led to much of a
choice of law revolution. The most influential proposal on the table, after
all, was still that of Beale.3" More courts probably followed some varia-
tion of the obligatio or vested rights theory than any other. A purely "sci-
entific" theory which described the behavior of courts would thus only
amount to more vested rights.
Launching a choice of law revolution would require a choice of law
theory different from what courts were already doing, one capable of
sweeping away the dusty remnants of vested rights that littered the case
reports. Value-free descriptive statements about how a judge was likely to
decide a particular case were not enough. Into this void stepped Brainerd
Currie, who, while not a wholehearted realist, was a wholehearted devo-
tee of Cook's attack on Joseph Beale."' Currie's proposal borrowed in
important ways from the realist program. In particular, he accepted
Cook's arguments that choice of law should not involve the attempted en-
forcement of vested rights but was simply a tool to effectuate state
policy.32
The central thesis of the modern approaches to choice of law is that
law-making is an instrumental activity. A legislator or common law judge
formulates norms in order to achieve some social purpose, not in order to
effectuate the parties' pre-existing rights. The focus of adjudication is sup-
posed to be forward-looking, unlike Beale's ideas, which were backward-
looking. Choice of law, the modern theorists claim, should reflect this fo-
cus as much as any other area of law. In deciding whether a particular
law applies in a case with interstate connections, the judge should analyze
the purposes underlying the competing legal norms. 3 What benefits were
the rules designed to achieve, or what evils were they designed to avert?
Once the judge has divined the instrumental purposes underlying the legal
rules, he or she can decide whether to apply a particular rule in a particu-
lar case.
There are many controversial aspects about the way that this central
thesis has been developed and applied since originally formulated. First,
identifying the instrumental purpose underlying a rule and deducing its
appropriate territorial scope is not as simple as one might think. As the
foremost proponent of "interest" or "policy" analysis, Currie argued that
one could divine a rule's purposes by the usual processes of domestic stat-
30. Cook himself realized that language in the case law supported vested rights analysis. See id. at
42.
31. Dane, supra note 1, at 1201.
32. For example, Currie's discussion of state policy relies upon Cook's discussion of illegal con-
tracts. See B. CURRIE, supra note 2, at 59 & n.140. Currie also acknowledged his reliance upon
Cook's ideas in his important discussion of married women's contract cases. See id. at 87 n.19.
33. See id. at 183-84.
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Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law
utory construction and interpretation,3 a method which has serious diffi-
culties.3 5 Another controversial aspect concerns the situation where the
judge decides that both states have policy reasons requiring application of
their laws; this is the well-known problem of the "true conflict." 6 Still a
third controversial aspect is whether to focus, as Currie did, on domicili-
ary contacts in the attempt to effectuate state policy. One might instead
turn to territorial connecting factors-the location of particular events-
and thus avoid the accusation that a state's choice of law regime discrimi-
nates against outsiders."7
These difficulties are all important and arguably fatal to modern policy
analysis. They concern how to go about the proposed program of using
choice of law to carry out legislative policy. A more fundamental issue is
whether this is the enterprise in which choice of law should be engaged.
By and large, current scholarship lets the modern analysis escape without
serious attention to this underlying jurisprudential assumption.8 My the-
sis here is that choice of law bears upon much more than the mere effec-
tuation of legislative policies. In particular, there should be limitations on
the extent to which a state may use application of local law to multistate
cases as a means to a local policy end. The limits exist because the parties
have rights-not vested rights in the sense that Beale intended, but rights
against the state. The rights-based limitations upon actions by states can
best be explained in terms of the philosophical distinction between deonto-
logical and consequentialist reasoning.
B. The Need for a Non-Consequentialist Approach
Modern choice of law theory is a consequentialist approach to adjudica-
tion of cases with interstate elements. Roughly speaking, this means that
alternative courses of action are evaluated according to the desirability of
their consequences. As a result, the modern theory is both forward-looking
and instrumental. Beale's theory of vested rights is both backward-looking
and deontological, although as we will see, it is not the only possible deon-
tological one (nor even the most plausible). 9
34. Id.
35. See Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. Rav. 392
(1980); Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House Without Foundations, 46 OHio ST.
L.J. 459 (1985).
36. Where a true conflict existed, Currie initially advised the forum to apply its own law. B.
CURRIE, supra note 2, at 184. He later advised that in true conflicts, states re-examine their interests
to see whether a more restrained interpretation of state interest is possible. See Currie, The Disinter-
ested Third State, 28 LAW & CoNTEMP. PioBs. 754, 756-58 (1963).
37. See Ely, supra note 1, at 173.
38. But see sources cited supra note 1.
39. "Backward-looking" and "deontological" are not synonymous; Beale's system is both. A redis-
tributive system based on a principle of complete equality could be deontological if its justification
were noninstrumental, but it would not be backward-looking. "Backward-looking" is more nearly
synonymous with "corrective justice," which is only one form of deontological reasoning. See generally
Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 977-81 (1988)
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What consequentialism means in this context, and the reasons that it is
problematic, can be illustrated informally. A thorny issue in modern
choice of law analysis is the proper treatment of cases involving after-
acquired domicile. Imagine a tort case in which the plaintiff and defend-
ant were originally both residents of the state where the accident occurred
and in which all the relevant events leading up to the tort occurred. After
the accident, the plaintiff moved to another state and managed to get juris-
diction over the defendant. The forum has a pro-recovery rule of law. If it
applies its own law to the case, the plaintiff will recover, with all the
hypothesized beneficial consequences usually cited in the conflicts litera-
ture (protection of destitute spouse and children, keeping the injured party
off of the local welfare rolls, and so on).4 Should it?
There is certainly an intuition that it should not. Even Brainerd Currie
balked at applying local law to further local policies in cases of after-
acquired domicile; his explanation (avoiding "retroactivity") sounds odd,
however, coming from an opponent of the vested rights approach.41 It is
not easy to explain from a strictly consequentialist perspective why it mat-
ters whether the plaintiff moved before or after the accident.4 2 Consider-
ing only the impact within the state, the cases seem virtually identical,
because the future consequences of applying local law are the same.
Under the modern approaches, the location of past events is virtually ir-
relevant, because in a forward-looking system, past events themselves are
(discussing corrective justice).
40. See, e.g., B. CURRIE, supra note 2, at 143 (injured party may become public charge), 144
(interests of legatees and creditors), 151-52 (interests of Good Samaritans), 160 (interests of insurance
companies).
41. Currie explained his hesitations in terms of vested rights. Assuming that the forum would not
apply its pro-recovery rule retroactively in a domestic case, "then [the forum] had not declared a
policy to the effect that vested rights must be altered to avoid the state's being burdened with indigent
beneficiaries, and so it had no justification for unsettling rights that had been settled by reference to
[the other state's] law." B. CURRIE, supra note 2, at 621.
Once one admits this sort of reasoning into conflicts cases, one risks sliding backwards into full-
scale Bealeanism. While Currie's emphasis on state policies would seem to permit a change of law
after a change of domicile, Currie was both unwilling to accept this result and unable to explain his
unwillingness in terms of his own theory.
42. There are a variety of ways that one might explain the disregard for the factor of after-
acquired domicile from a consequentialist point of view. One might say, for instance, that it would be
counterproductive to reward persons who moved into the state to take advantage of favorable local
law. This particular rationale might run afoul of the constitutional protection of the right to travel.
Cf. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985) (invalidating tax benefit restricted to
persons acquiring local domicile after certain cut-off date). Perhaps more to the point, this example
demonstrates the potential subtlety and flexibility of consequentialist reasoning generally. In moral
theory, consequentialists have often attempted to show how standard moral intuitions can be ex-
plained in consequentialist terms. Sometimes these explanations are convincing and sometimes
strained. What seems unmistakable, however, is that the consequentialists find ordinary moral intu-
itions sufficiently important to attempt to explain them in consequentialist terms, rather than to flatly
declare the intuitions mistaken.
The same is true here. Perhaps it is possible to explain the discounting of after-acquired domicile in
consequentialist terms. This does not mean that there is no common and apparently deontological
intuition to the effect that after-acquired domicile should be discounted. Nor does it mean that a
choice of law doctrine (such as existing modem approaches) that cannot explain this intuition is
acceptable.
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Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law
irrelevant. The obvious way to distinguish these cases is on the basis of
what happened in the past, by explaining why it is unfair to allow the
plaintiff unilaterally to change the applicable law by moving from one
state to another. But such a notion of desert is foreign to consequentialist
analysis.
A more precise analysis of the difficulties with consequentialist reason-
ing in the choice of law context requires a somewhat more precise idea of
what consequentialism means. No single definition of the term would
seem to command assent from all moral philosophers. However, defini-
tional controversies are not likely to trouble our present enterprise, be-
cause our competing theories of choice of law seem to fall squarely within
the uncontested meanings of "consequentialist" and "deontological." In
the usual context of moral philosophy,
[clonsequentialism in its purest and simplest form is a moral doctrine
which says that the right act in any given situation is the one that
will produce the best overall outcome, as judged from an impersonal
standpoint which gives equal weight to the interests of every-
one. . . .[A consequentialist theory] gives some principle for rank-
ing overall states of affairs from best to worst from an impersonal
standpoint, and then it says that the right act in any given situation
is the one that will produce the highest-ranked state of affairs that
the agent is in a position to produce."3
Probably the best known version of consequentialist moral theory is utili-
tarianism, which says that the proper action is the one which maximizes
overall human happiness. A deontological theory, by contrast, places limits
upon the pursuit of the general good by virtue of the intrinsic merits of
alternative courses of action. Whether an action is correct does not depend
entirely upon its consequences. A deontological system of ethics, according
to J.C.C. Smart, "is any system which does not appeal to the conse-
quences of our actions, but which appeals to conformity with certain rules
of duty. '
44
In what sense is modern choice of law theory, like much modern realist
jurisprudence, consequentialist? The similarity between Brainerd Currie's
approach to choice of law and the sorts of theories proposed by philosoph-
ical consequentialists lies in the fact that the relevant consideration is the
impact of a decision on the general social good, rather than the claims of
the instant parties to fair treatment. Both theories counsel the pursuit of
social goals-a forward-looking focus-instead of attempting to imple-
ment the parties' pre-existing rights-a backward-looking focus resem-
bling that of Beale.
43. Scheffler, Introduction, in CONS-QUEN'IlISM AND rS CRIrc S 1 (S. Scheffler ed. 1988).
44. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in UTIIr.IARIAN1SM: FOR AND A(;AINST
5 (1973).
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The Yale Law Journal
Despite the strong similarities, modern choice of law theory is conse-
quentialism of a distinct sort. The differences between most consequential-
ist theories and Currie's choice of law approach arise primarily out of two
facts: First, for choice of law purposes, we are concerned with a theory of
adjudication rather than a theory of personal morality, and second, our
context is multistate problems. Because the modern choice of law ap-
proaches deal with judicial implementation of legislative goals through ad-
judication, the judge is advised not simply to pursue "happiness" (or some
other social good) directly. In terms of our earlier definition of consequen-
tialism, one might imagine that the legislature draws up a list ranking the
possible states of affairs of the world from "best" to "worst" according to
its own system of values, and then the judge decides the case to try to
achieve the best possible state of affairs on the list. The judge, in other
words, maximizes the legislatively-chosen values.
The second fact-that choice of law deals with multistate
problems-matters because the legislature, according to modern policy
analysis, sets out only to maximize the benefit to its own state. To use
Smart's terminology, the calculation of benefits is "localized in space."45
In choosing which social values to pursue, a state is supposed to think in
terms only of the needs of its own citizens and of costs and benefits in-
curred upon its own territory." Judges deciding choice of law cases are
not supposed to see their function as universalistic. If they were to maxi-
mize the global benefit according to the legislature's definition of desirable
states of affairs, they would apply local law to all cases that came before
them. A consequentialist theory need not focus on local matters, as Cur-
rie's approach did, even in a multistate context. Under a universalistic
consequentialist theory, a state might adopt that substantive policy which
it thinks is best for the world at large. This is not, however, what the
modern choice of law theorists had in mind.
So one might identify the consequentialist component of modern choice
of law theory as its principle that if the values in the local statute would
be furthered within the state by applying the law, then the state has a
policy reason or "interest" in having its law applied. The relevant ques-
tions are: Which state will bear the long-range social consequences of the
judicial decision? Will application of a particular statute prevent those
consequences (if they are evil) or help to promote them (if they are
beneficial)?
That modern choice of law theory is consequentialist is supported by
several additional arguments. First, the terminology chosen by choice of
law theorists is suggestive. Modern choice of law theory is said to involve
45. Id. at 63. Smart contrasts "generalized benevolence" that motivates typically utilitarian theory
with benevolence that is localized in space. The latter he characterizes as ethics of the tribe or race.
46. Indeed, this is the source of some criticism; it raises the question of whether interest analysis is
"discriminatory." See Ely, supra note 1.
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Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law
the implementation of state policy choices. Recent writing by authors such
as Ronald Dworkin on the jurisprudence of adjudication sets up the con-
test between deontological and consequentialist reasoning by using very
similar phrasing: Adjudication based on "principle" is said to effectuate
the parties' rights, and adjudication based on "policy" is said to further
collective social goals.'7 We should perhaps not place too much weight,
however, upon this coincidence of terminology. The modern choice of law
theorists have themselves not addressed explicitly the issue of the desira-
bility of consequentialist reasoning, and conversely, current jurispruden-
tial writing does not purport to address choice of law directly. Other as-
pects of the modern theories of choice of law, however, strongly reinforce
the suspicion of a bias towards consequentialism. Two deserve mention
here.
One is the willingness to consider the interests of persons who are not
formal parties to the instant litigation. For example, a typical torts case
involves a plaintiff who is seeking recovery and a defendant who resists
being required to pay. It is fairly standard in interest analysis opinions
and literature to allude to the needs of local nonparties whose economic
interests will be affected by the decision. Discussions are peopled by hypo-
thetical medical creditors, destitute spouses and children, insurance com-
panies, and the like.' This solicitude for persons who are not, technically
speaking, parties to the litigation suggests that the court is engaged in
some overall maximizing of social benefits and burdens as part of its
choice of law analysis.
Considering the second aspect involves a closer look at the jurispruden-
tial premises of the policy analysts' critique of the vested rights approach.
Their analysis demonstrates a lack of concern with what the parties might
deserve as a result of their past actions. The realists' attack, as we saw
earlier, belittled the ideas of vested rights and territoriality on which the
Bealean analysis rested. In the course of his critique, Cook gave an illumi-
nating hypothetical example."9 He asked the reader to imagine that Eng-
land might pass a law criminally punishing the commission anywhere in
the world of what England considered murder.
Aside from questions of practicability in execution, it seems to be in
keeping with the idea that the object of the criminal law is not to
satisfy the thirst for revenge but rather to protect society from per-
sons whose overt conduct reveals dangerous and anti-social tenden-
cies. . . . It would seem that only a clinging to the crude and primi-
tive idea that the sole object of the criminal law is 'punishment' for
an 'offense' against the 'sovereign' could lead to the opposite conclu-
47. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 90-100 (1976) (comparing rights, goals, princi-
ples, and utility); id. at 82 (contrasting principles and policies).
48. See supra note 40.
49. W. COOK, supra note 20, at 15-16.
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The Yale Law Journal
sion [that such a law is impermissible]. . . . Whether similar laws
passed by American states would violate the constitutional require-
ment of [the] 'due process' clause is of course a still different ques-
tion, upon which also no opinion is offered at this place, other than
to say that apparently only a blind following of unsound territorial
notions would lead to the conclusion of unconstitutionality as distin-
guished from social desirability.50
The instrumental character of this analysis of the criminal law is un-
mistakable. Cook did not rely in any way upon the fact that homicide
might also be criminal in the nation or state where the relevant activities
or injuries occurred. What seemed important to Cook was that England
was concerned with protecting English society from dangerous persons.
The idea that the criminal law might be designed to effect retribution
struck Cook as primitive and crude. Of course, retribution is a backward-
looking concept, and deterrence, rehabilitation, and the protection of soci-
ety are forward-looking. This seems precisely the reason that Cook found
retribution such an unconvincing explanation, thereby rejecting the possi-
bility that English law of homicide should be limited to homicides that in
some part, at least, transpired upon English soil.
What Cook has done is precisely to reject the main deontological expla-
nation for criminal prosecution. The different possible explanations for
criminal punishment have quite different philosophical overtones.51 Theo-
ries of rehabilitation and of general and specific deterrence have a conse-
quentialist character; they propose that punishment is proper either when
it would deter criminal activity generally or when it would reduce the
likelihood of a specific individual committing further criminal acts. Retri-
bution is deontological; it asks merely whether the particular defendant
deserves to be punished.
What should also be clear from the philosophical literature on criminal
law is that instrumental or consequentialist reasoning is highly problem-
atic as a basis for punishment. 2 Consequentialist reasoning might permit
or even require a judge to punish someone who was quite innocent in the
factual sense. If the community believed that the defendant was guilty,
then deterrence might be served by punishment regardless of the defend-
ant's real guilt or innocence. By the same token, consequentialist reason-
ing would permit or require preventive detention of someone who had
never committed any crime, simply on the grounds that he or she was a
danger to society. When criminal law is divorced from the backward-
50. Id. at 15-16.
51. See in particular H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RISPONSIBII.I'rY (1968).
52. See H.L.A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in id. at 1. In particular,
see id. at 8-21. See also J. COLEMAN, MARKEIS, MORALS, AND THE LAW 164 (1988) ("[In crimes
the question is whether the state has the right to deprive a particular person of his liberty by incarcer-
ating him.").
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Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law
looking reasoning about what the defendant actually deserves, it becomes
enormously morally problematic.
And the same is true of choice of law reasoning. Recalling our example
of after-acquired domicile, the problem with consequentialist reasoning is
that it is indifferent to what the parties deserve. The defendant, who is
required to pay simply because the plaintiff moved to another state, is in a
situation similar to that of the innocent defendant sent to jail for deterrent
purposes. The problem with consequentialist approaches to choice of law
is that the individual is treated merely as a means to an end.53 Indeed, this
is a principal philosophical objection to consequentialist reasoning in gen-
eral. It can on occasion require or permit the sacrifice of the claims of one
individual to the general good of society, without regard for whether im-
posing this sacrifice is fair. A major problem with strictly consequentialist
reasoning is that there are strongly held moral intuitions that human be-
ings are not just means to an end, but must be treated as ends in them-
selves. This is one basis of a moral theory of rights. It is also the basis of a
rights-based theory of adjudication, generally, and of adjudication of
choice of law cases, specifically.
C. Rights in Multistate Cases
To this point, one might expect that Joseph Beale would have been
sympathetic. The goal of choice of law adjudication, in Beale's view, was
to enforce the parties' rights, not just to effectuate legislative policies. But
where do we find these rights? Beale saw the rights as vested legal rights
arising out of the applicable state's substantive law. This response is inad-
equate, but not because (as some realists argued) the idea of rights is non-
sense. Beale's theory of rights is inadequate because it presupposes the
answer to the important choice of law question, namely, what law is
applicable?
Of course, Beale had an answer to this question. One determined what
rights the parties had after ascertaining the applicable law through a vari-
ety of territorial rules. For instance, torts cases were governed by the place
53. In all fairness, one should acknowledge both the efforts to salvage consequentialist theories
from these objections and the objections to deontological theories themselves. One effort to explain
common moral intuitions in instrumental terms is known as "rule utilitarianism." Generally speaking,
it is desirable to have a society in which important human interests such as liberty and bodily integrity
are respected. This belief supports giving such interests special protections, for instance by adopting
rules that these interests shall not be violated. One problem with rule utilitarianism is whether it
affords adequate protection in cases where the benefits of violating the rule would be substantial.
Deontological reasoning, of course, has its own problems. In particular, there seem to be cases
where a small violation of rights would be acceptable in order to save the lives of millions of innocent
persons. Obviously, assessing the relative merits of a refined version of consequentialism and of deon-
tological reasoning is no easy task. A huge philosophical literature exists. My point is simply that the
sort of simple-minded consequentialism that motivates much choice of law analysis is grossly inade-
quate. Whether a refined consequentialism would be satisfactory is beyond the scope of this discus-
sion, although I tend to doubt it. The difficulties in turn of developing an adequate deontological
account are manifest in Part II, infra.
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where the last act giving rise to a claim occurred-that is, the place of
injury.5' Contract rights vested under the law of the place where the con-
tract was formed."5 Note, however, that the concept of "rights" itself did
not supply these territorial rules; the territorial rules, instead, defined the
rights. Territoriality was derived from a notion of state sovereignty that
was not itself rights-based.
There is an alternative conception of rights that does not require prior
identification of the applicable substantive law. That alternative concep-
tion supplies the foundation for a new rights-based model of choice of law.
It is more nearly analogous to common notions of individual fairness and
thus more successfully avoids the defects of consequentialist reasoning. It
follows directly from the notion that states are limited in their pursuit of
the common good at the expense of the individual. These rights are politi-
cal rights because they concern the political relationship between the state
and the individual. One's rights to resist the imposition of a personal bur-
den for the common good are political rights, though not necessarily rec-
ognized substantive legal rights.
A general political theory of rights both defines situations in which a
state is entitled to coerce individual citizens for the general good of others
and identifies situations in which the individual is not obliged to obey.
Although it is not common now to speak of litigants having rights to judi-
cial recognition of some pre-existing substantive legal claims (as Beale and
Dworkin do) it is not at all unusual to speak of individual rights against
the state in somewhat different circumstances. For example, we might
speak of a right of free speech, or a right of property, or a right to equal
treatment. In the post-realist world that we inhabit, the word "rights"
lingers even though most of us tend not to describe adjudication in terms
of judicial enforcement of vested legal rights.
Political rights of this sort have something of a constitutional flavor,
and indeed it is in constitutional adjudication that we find talk of rights to
be most prominent. Yet this does not mean that the only rights that can be
meaningfully discussed are constitutional rights. One might also believe in
political rights that were not recognized by the framers of the Constitu-
tion. These rights are still relevant to legal discourse in that one might
attempt to secure them institutional recognition. One might try to per-
suade a constitutional convention or a legislature of the existence of
animal rights, for instance, or of fetal rights, or of rights against discrimi-
nation on the basis of sexual preference, regardless of whether one be-
lieved that these already were reflected in the Constitution. Similarly, one
might make arguments about such rights in an effort to influence courts in
interpreting an ambiguous statute or formulating a common law rule. To
54. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377.
55. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 311, 323, 325.
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Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law
make a rights-based argument is to make a normative claim that a judge
or legislator ought to honor the right in question.56
A political right that has not been. institutionally recognized presents a
difficult personal decision for a judge who feels bound by positive law that
violates that right. For choice of law purposes, however, we need not re-
solve what a judge should do when confronted by unambiguous authorita-
tive instructions that disregard rights that the judge believes to exist. The
reason is that there is little explicit legislative guidance about how to de-
cide choice of law cases. Typically, the common law judge is left without
explicit instructions to decide the territorial reach of a statute; there is
plenty of room in this inquiry for a rights-based analysis. Deontological
analysis of parties' rights finds its most important expression in such
cases.
Whatever the merits of consequentialist reasoning in moral theory or as
a general theory of adjudication, there are special reasons to find it want-
ing as an approach to choice of law. The state's authority over litigants is
most tenuous in multistate cases. The claims of one of the parties are
being sacrificed to further the general good of a community of which he or
she may not even be a part. If a local citizen challenges a consequentialist
local rule on the grounds that it unfairly sacrifices his or her rights to the
common good, there may at least be the response that the rule is a product
of political processes in which the individual has participated. In cases
where one or both of the litigants may hail from other states, this response
may not be available. The question then arises whether there is a legiti-
mate basis to require the individual's contribution.
In the choice of law context the purported justifications for a system of
adjudication that maximizes the total good to society are least persuasive.
Perhaps the best known justification of such a system of adjudication is
the theory of the efficiency of the common law, which is defended by some
on the ground that it increases the total amount of wealth to society. One
defense of this theory of "wealth maximization" is that by increasing the
total wealth available to society, it increases the expectations of all of soci-
ety's members. 57 But it is one thing to defend consequentialism on the
56. Moreover, there is nothing peculiar about arguing that state law ought to recognize the rights
of non-citizens to be free from local authority even when the Constitution does not, strictly speaking,
require it. Admittedly, such rights arise from the fact that our states exist within a federal system. But
this does not mean that they are only cognizable in the federal constitution. The fact that a state is
free constitutionally to apply its law does not mean that it ought not to be respectful of the claims of
other states and their inhabitants: The federal constitution only sets a floor below which no state may
go. While there is no guarantee that a state will be persuaded by arguments about interstate rights,
this should not prevent us from making such arguments and believing in them.
57. R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1983); see also Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility
in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking, 61 J. POL ECON. 434 (1953); Harsanyi,
Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL.
EcoN. 309 (1955). Posner, of course, distinguishes carefully between wealth maximization and utili-
tarianism. R. POSNER, supra, at 6-87. His ethical defense of wealth maximization relies on the
grounds of ex ante compensation, among other things. Id. at 94. To the extent that this argument
1989] 1293
HeinOnline -- 98 Yale L. J. 1293 1988-1989
i ts, air , a i 1
a e ri ts- s r t i t j
r l isl t r t t t ri i 58
litical ri t t t t een. i r
iffic lt rs l i i j f l l
i l t s t t ri t. i l
solve hat a judge s l fr t i
ti e i str cti s t t i r r i t t
reason is t at t ere is littl li it l i l ti i
cide choice f la s s. i ll , t
explicit instructions to decide t e territ rial r f t t t ; t
plenty of roo in this inquiry f r a ri ts- s l i . t l i l
analysis of arties' ri ts fi it t i t t
.
ate er t rits f ti list i
a e eral t e r f j i ti , t i l
ing as an approach to choice f la . st t 's t rit r liti t
ost tenuous in ultistate cases. l i s f t ti
being sacrificed to further t e e eral f it i
she a t e e rt. l l iti list
local rule on t e r s t at it f irl rifi i
co on good, there ay at least e t r s s t t t l i t
of political processes in ic t e i i i l rti i t .
here one or both f t e liti a ts il fr t t t ,
ay not be available. he question t e arises t r t r i l iti-
ate basis to require t e i i i l's tri ti .
In the choice of la context the purported j stificati s f r t f
adjudication t at i i s t t t l t i t
Perhaps the best kno n j stificati f t j i ti
the theory of the efficiency of the co on la , ic is efe e
on the ground that it increases the total a t f lt t i t .
defense of this theory of " ealth i i tion" i t t i i
total ealth available to society, it i creases t t ti s f ll i
ety's e bers.57 ut it is e t i t f entialism
56. oreover, there is nothing peculiar about arguing that state la ought t rec ize t ri t
of non-citizens to be free from local authority even hen the onstitution does not, strictl s ea i ,
require it. Admittedly, such rights arise fro the fact that our states exist ithin a fe eral s st . t
this does not mean that they are only cognizable in the federal constitution. he fact that a state is
free constitutionally to apply its law does not ean that it ought not to be respectful f t e clai s f
other states and their inhabitants: The federal constitution only sets a floor belo hich state a
go. While there is no guarantee that a state will be persuaded by argu ents about interstate rights,
this should not prevent us fro aking such argu ents and believing in t e .
57. R. POSNER, THE EcoNOMICS OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1983); see also arsanyi, ardinal tility
in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking, 61 J. co . 4 (1953); rsanyi,
Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal o parisons f tility, 63 . OL.
ECON. 309 (1955). Posner, of course, distinguishes carefully between ealth axi ization and utili-
tarianism. R. POSNER, supra, at 6-87. His ethical defense of ealth axi ization relies on t e
grounds of ex ante compensation, among other things. Id. at 94. To the extent that this argu ent
The Yale Law Journal
theory that when the pie is enlarged, each person's share is likely to be
more generous. It would be quite another to expand the pie at the expense
of someone who is not entitled to demand a piece at all.
The point here is merely that there are normative' difficulties in apply-
ing consequentialist reasoning in cases that transcend state borders.
Whatever the merits of adjudicative efforts to further social policy, one
cannot simply take for granted the fairness of using the litigant in a multi-
state case as a means to that end. One must show that the individual is
properly subject to the state's authority before he or she can be called
upon to contribute to the state's social good. The existence of choice of law
rights should, for this reason, be even less controversial than the existence
of domestic rights.
Choice of law rights arise out of the fact that the state's legitimate au-
thority is finite and the state ought to recognize this.5" A state is entitled
to coerce because it has satisfied the standards of political legitimacy that
define the situations in which state coercion is proper. An overly simpli-
fied example will illustrate the argument well enough for present pur-
poses. Assume that the only acceptable basis for state coercion is that the
coerced individual is a member of the voting population. If this is the case,
this standard defines the situations where state coercion is permissible,
because the state is then entitled to coerce only individuals who possess the
right to vote in its elections. When cases involve individuals who cannot
vote, the state's law may not apply to burden them. A political theory
based on electoral participation thus translates into a choice of law
principle.
When a judge decides that it is permissible to apply local law to a
multistate controversy, he or she is necessarily deciding a question of po-
litical legitimacy at the same time. The choice of law decision rests upon
an assumption that the criteria for legitimate political authority have been
works, it is because to say that some system is wealth-maximizing is to say that the costs would be
higher under other systems; this is the reason that ex ante compensation, and consent, can be assumed.
Id. at 95. For an excellent critique, see J. COLEMAN, supra note 52, at 164-65 (1988).
58. Choice of law rights may be usefully compared to other sorts of rights that can arise in either
the interstate or international setting, such as international human rights. These rights, such as the
right against torture or genocide, are typically rights that one would have against one's own govern-
ment that are also accorded international protection. They arise simply because one is a human being.
The political rights discussed here have a somewhat similar normative ground. The distinctive fea-
ture of these choice of law rights is that one is more likely to have a good claim against a foreign
government than against one's own government, because it is less likely in the former case that the
conditions for legitimacy have been met. Political rights therefore take on a distinctive interstate im-
portance, since they are more likely to matter in the interstate context. Human rights are called
international human rights, in contrast, in order to emphasize that there is a basis for international
recognition and enforcement, even though the violation might appear to be a purely domestic matter
involving a citizen's claims against his or her own government. International human rights do not
have a different content simply because they are international.
Little depends upon this distinction, because both international human rights and our political
rights are grounded in principles of political fairness and supply normative arguments about what
states should do. Violations of international human rights are, of course, more likely to be seriously
morally objectionable than violations of choice of law rights.
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met. Satisfaction of the criteria for legitimate authority is necessary to
make the application of local law fair. Principles of political fairness sup-
ply the criteria for the legitimate exercise of authority. While the disci-
pline of political philosophy addresses numerous other issues of state au-
thority, one of the central issues that political philosophers have
considered is the necessary and sufficient criteria for creating in the indi-
vidual an obligation to obey. This issue is central to a political rights
model of choice of law, as well.
The central role of political legitimacy in this model is the reason for
calling these rights political rights. While some political rights are rights
that arise within a political relationship, such as a right to fair treatment
by one's own government, this view is unnecessarily narrow. Another sort
of claim is that the individual lacks the necessary political connection with
the state to make the exercise of its authority legitimate. Negative rights to
be left alone may also be political rights. For instance, if an anarchist
denied that any government might ever exercise legitimate coercive au-
thority, the individual's right to resist could be said to arise out of the
anarchist's political philosophy. Principles of political fairness give rise to
both positive claims to certain sorts of treatment and negative claims to be
left alone.
Before we move on to the obviously difficult program of spelling out
what rights might be thought to exist in the choice of law context, it is
worth noting the substantial ways in which this idea of rights differs from
the vested rights envisioned by Joseph Beale. The key differences are two:
The rights are mostly negative rights instead of positive rights, and they
are vertical rights that the individual possesses against the state directly,
rather than horizontal rights against the other party to the litigation.
It is easy enough to see why rights to remain unmolested by a state that
has no legitimate source of authority are negative rights,5 9 while the rights
that interested Joseph Beale and (for the most part) Ronald Dworkin
should be characterized as positive rights.60 Vested rights are positive
rights because the forum (absent one of a few recognized exceptions"1 ) is
59. The requirement of mutuality, see infra Part II(C), seems at first to be more than a negative
right because it requires that a state bestow benefits if it is going to impose burdens. Despite this
aspect, the requirement can be seen as negative because a state can satisfy it by leaving an individual
completely alone. The requirement is that an individual be free from imbalanced choice of law rules.
60. For similar usage of the term "negative" versus positive or "affirmative" rights, see Narveson,
Contractarian Rights, in UTILITY AND RIGHTS 161 (R. Frey ed. 1984). Cf DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dept. of Social Services, 57 U.S.L.W. 4218 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1989) (Fourteenth Amendment
does not impose affirmative duty on state to protect individuals from one another). My claim here,
unlike the majority opinion in DeShaney, is not that the Constitution provides no general affirmative
rights. First, DeShaney involved federal constitutional law while the subject at issue here is state-
created rights. Second, the point here is merely that negative rights are typically easier to demonstrate
than positive rights, rather than that the latter do not exist at all. Cf I. BERLIN, Two CONCEF-rs OF
LIBERTY (1958).
61. One exception is the rule on "public policy," which allows the forum to disregard the other-
wise applicable law if it is seriously contrary to local moral principles. See REsTATEMENT (FIRsr) OF
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obligated to help the litigant in some affirmative way. A political rights
model recognizes also that persons have rights to be left alone.
Note that while Bealean vested rights are supposedly present in every
case-one party or the other has an affirmative right to prevail-in some
cases no political rights-based constraints may be present. It is entirely
possible that more than one state whose laws could be applied may have
the sort of relationship with the litigants and the controversy so that there
is no political unfairness. In this respect, rights to be free of state law are
similar to rights against assertion of state adjudicative jurisdiction. The
fact that state A is entitled to assert adjudicative jurisdiction says virtually
nothing about whether state B is entitled to do so as well. Similarly, the
mere fact that state A may fairly apply its law does not mean that state B
may not. In other words, there is no reason to expect that a particular
choice of law will uniquely satisfy political rights requirements. A rights-
based analysis of choice of law, like an analysis of personal jurisdiction,
merely imposes a threshold fairness test for the burdensome application of
a law that might be met by one state or by several. Unlike personal juris-
diction, however, this right can be possessed by either the plaintiff or the
defendant, because either one might complain about a coercive application
of state A's law.62
The analogy to personal jurisdiction should also help to clarify the sec-
ond distinction between Bealean and political rights. One's choice of law
rights are, like personal jurisdiction rights, held against the state directly.
They are not rights against the other party to the lawsuit (although, of
course, they will affect one's legal claims). Nor are political choice of law
rights possessed by sovereign states against one another. Because the pos-
sibility that states might possess sovereignty rights against one another has
led to some confusion in the Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction cases,
it is worth pausing a moment to describe the relationship between argu-
ments of individual fairness and this potential argument about state
sovereignty. 3
The political rights-based argument is related to the issue of state sover-
eignty in that the individual's claim of immunity from state law is a claim
that the state would be exceeding its legitimate sovereignty if it were to
apply its law. It is unfair (and thus a violation of individual rights) for a
state to exceed the legitimate scope of its sovereign power. To say that a
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612.
62. Of course, it is most likely that the defendant will complain, since the plaintiff selected the
forum and may have taken choice of law into account in making this decision. But see, e.g., Lilienthal
v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964) (plaintiff chose Oregon court in which to collect promis-
sory notes despite existence of Oregon spendthrift laws protecting defendant).
63. Confusion occurs in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694 (1982), in which the Court apparently assumed that personal jurisdiction could either in-
volve an individual right or a claim based on federalism and state sovereignty. Id. at 702 n.10. For an
interesting discussion of the relationship between individual fairness and state sovereignty, see Stein,
supra note 1.
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claim invokes the finite nature of state sovereignty does not mean, how-
ever, that it involves an assertion that the state transgresses against the
sovereignty of some other state. Indeed, this discussion of political rights
does not rely in any way on the rights of other states. Our sovereignty-
related claim concerns fairness to individuals, not fairness to other states.
Such an approach to sovereignty is "vertical" in the sense that the focus
is on the relationship between the state and the individual, rather than on
the relations between equal sovereign states. Analysis of the relations be-
tween equal sovereign states is "horizontal."'" While our political rights
theory certainly involves issues of state sovereignty, it is primarily con-
cerned with the right of individuals not to be subjected to unfair
treatment.
To this point, of course, we have said very little about what political
rights exist, and what fairness may require of choice of law doctrine. At
most we have argued that there is an approach to rights which sounds
more plausible to modern ears than Bealean vested rights, and that these
rights to be treated as more than merely the means to the end of some
other community's social good stem from principles of political fairness.
The next, and larger, task is to say something about what such rights
might look like. What rights do we have?
II. A POLITICAL RIGHTS MODEL OF CHOICE OF LAW
A political rights model of choice of law requires a state to justify its
exercise of coercive authority over an individual aggrieved by the applica-
tion of the state's law. This right of the individual litigant to a justification
for state coercion need not have constitutional status; to claim such a right
is to make a normative argument that may or may not have been recog-
nized institutionally. A legal decision by the forum to recognize this right
by not applying its own law resembles adoption of a state long-arm stat-
ute. A state long-arm statute might deliberately be written so as not to
extend to the limits tolerated by the federal constitution, in order to re-
spect what the state saw as nonconstitutional fairness claims of defend-
ants. By the same token, a state might recognize claims of individual
rights and fairness to a greater degree in choice of law issues than the
minimal standard imposed by due process.
This model of rights requires close attention to the state's purported
justification for the exercise of coercive power. The first task of a political
rights model is to identify the circumstances under which the state has, or
lacks, an adequate justification for coercion. Political choice of law rights
derive from the limited nature of such political justifications. What sorts
of justifications would satisfy our standard of fairness? Here we encounter
64. L. BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL AcTs 2-3 (1989).
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difficult questions that have proved troublesome to political philosophers.
The best that we can do here is to outline the most convincing solutions
yet offered to the problem of political justification.
A. Consent and Domicile
The two most intuitively acceptable bases for state coercion are proba-
bly express consent and the domicile of the party burdened by the applic-
able law. Express consent is well recognized both by political theorists65
and the judges who have written choice of lawe6 and personal jurisdic-
tion" opinions, although we will see below that standing by itself, consent
may not be adequate. Similarly, most political philosophers investigating
the problem of the state's rights to coerce have assumed that citizenship or
domicile is one of the strongest possible justifications for state authority;
the paradigm case of political authority, in fact, has been the obligation of
the citizen to his or her own government.6 8
There has, of course, been substantial dispute about why, as a philo-
sophical matter, citizenship is an adequate basis for state coercion. 6 As a
matter of choice of law, however, it seems that we cannot afford to be as
concerned as professional philosophers about such scruples. Anarchism
does not have a promising future as a basis for judicial decision making in
choice of law cases, any more than in any other sort of substantive dis-
pute; thus some basis for political obligation must be found. In the purely
domestic arena, we seem content to point to the right to participate in
political processes."0 If this is adequate for domestic cases, then it would
seem adequate for conflicts cases as well.
What ought to be the relevant affiliating characteristics of corporations?
Corporations are not automatically ineligible to be the possessors of rights,
although it should not be assumed that they will necessarily have the same
rights as natural persons.71 There would seem to be few objections, either
as a matter of case law7 2 or otherwise, to subjecting the corporation to the
65. A survey of explanations of political obligation is found in A. SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES
AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS (1979). Simmons concludes that express consent is an adequate expla-
nation in theory but is rarely satisfied in fact.
66. Choice of law contractual clauses, which are usually enforced, are the most obvious example
of consent to the application of a particular law. See, e.g., E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS
632-36 (1982).
67. See, e.g., National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964) (personal jurisdic-
tion can be based upon consent expressed in choice of forum clause).
68. Simmons phrases the problem this way, and in dismissing the usual justifications, decides that
no one has any more obligation to his or her own government than to the state in which one is
present. A. SIMMONS, supra note 65, at 3-4.
69. For a thorough critique, see R.P. WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM (1970).
70. This is one foundation, in constitutional challenges, for the judge's rejoinder that the com-
plainant should "take it to the legislature."
71. They do not possess rights under the privileges and immunities clause, for example. See Met-
ropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1984). However, they do have due process rights;
much due process litigation involves corporate entities.
72. In choice of law, for example, the internal affairs doctrine applies the law of the state of
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law of its state of incorporation. As a creature of that state's laws, absent
considerations of federal constitutional or statutory law objections, the cor-
poration can have only such rights and obligations as the state's laws be-
stow. This does not mean that the corporation lacks relevant affiliations
with other states. Perhaps most significantly, corporations often exercise
considerable political clout in states other than the state of incorporation.
In some instances, it might be reasonable to treat a foreign corporation as
functionally analogous to an individual voter."3
We can proceed on the assumption, then, that domicile, incorporation,
and the right to participate politically are adequate justifications. These
might loosely be referred to as domiciliary connections, and they supple-
ment express consent as an adequate political justification for the exercise
of state power. This domiciliary principle reveals an important distin-
guishing feature of the political rights approach to choice of law. In the
historical dispute between the vested rights theorists and the interest ana-
lysts, the important dispute sometimes seemed to be between those who
would base decisions upon territorial connecting factors and those who
would base decisions upon domiciliary connecting factors." The Bealeans
seemed to take a rule's scope as territorial unless clearly such would be
unreasonable, while the interest theorists took a rule as domiciliary unless
clearly proven otherwise. Our discussion of the use of domiciliary factors
under a political rights model shows that these are not the only two
alternatives.
The reliance upon domiciliary factors in a political rights analysis is
different in the following way. Unlike the Bealean system, in a political
rights analysis domiciliary connecting factors are of front-line importance,
not secondary to territorial connecting factors. More important, under the
political rights model, domiciliary factors function solely as a justification
for the imposition of burdens; it is the party who is burdened that must
have a local domicile. Under Bealean theory, domiciliary factors are not
limited in this way; it is not relevant which party benefits. Traditional
vested rights analysis is "jurisdiction-selecting" in that it does not require
the court to ascertain the content of the law before deciding whether it is
incorporation on matters of internal corporate governance. E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 66, at
890. This doctrine has received something of an imprimatur in the Court's commerce clause cases,
e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S.
624 (1982); Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal Affairs Doctrine in
Corporation Law, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 29 (1987); Pinto, The Constitution and the Market for Corpo-
rate Control: State Takeover Statutes After CTS Corp., 29 WMi. & MARY L. REv. 699 (1988).
73. See Brilmayer, Haverkamp, Logan, Lynch, Neuwirth & O'Brien, A General Look at General
Jurisdiction, 66 TEx. L. REv. 721, 742 (1988) [hereinafter Brilmayer, A General Look].
74. Of course, this oversimplifies. The Bealean approach relied upon domiciliary connectors in
certain situations, such as some rules of family law or estates and trusts, see RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 137 (legitimacy), § 295 (trusts), while the modem interest theories have
occasionally relied upon territorial connectors, for instance in situations where a legal rule is clearly
conduct-regulating. See Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MiCn. L.
REV. 392 (1980) (discussing conduct-regulating rules).
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applicable." The Bealean rules on family law or validity of wills do not
depend upon whether the law advantages or disadvantages the local per-
son. By the same token, most statutory choice of law rules that rely upon
domiciliary connections do so without asking whether the local person will
be helped or hurt; they too are jurisdiction-selecting.78
The function of domiciliary factors as burdening links in the political
rights model also differentiates it from interest analysis. In interest analy-
sis, domiciliary factors matter when they establish that application of local
law will benefit one of the state's own people. For example, a guest stat-
ute is presumed to create an interest when its application would work to
the benefit of a local party, namely the defendant in a tort suit.77 Whether
application of local law would burden a local person is not directly rele-
vant to modern choice of law approaches.78 There is assumed to be no
reason that a state would set out to burden its own people. While there
may be situations where the burdened individual is a local (in all purely
domestic situations this will be true, for instance), this is not the desired
goal but simply an unavoidable byproduct of the desire to help the other
party to the litigation. In the modern approach, pro-plaintiff laws are
only implicated when the plaintiff is a local person, and pro-defendant
laws are only implicated when the defendant is a local person.
The political rights model is different from both traditional and modern
choice of law theories because, while it inquires into the content of the
rule, the relevant question is whether the burdened party is local. Al-
though we will see below that some versions of a rights-based approach,
taken as a whole, might be jurisdiction-selecting, 7 -and that interest
analysis itself, when applied consistently, is jurisdiction-selecting as
well180-the simple domiciliary principle that we have so far identified is
not. It depends upon the law's content. So does the determination whether
an interest exists, although the two are very different: the political rights-
based approach relies upon content in a way that is the opposite of the
way that policy or interest analysis does. Instead of finding a reason for
the law's applicability in the fact that a local would benefit, one finds a
justification for the law's applicability in the fact that a local would be
burdened.
It is no coincidence that political rights analysis and policy analysis are
75. This was the foundation of early and influential criticisms of vested rights analysis. An early
essay by Cavers criticized the traditional rules for their content-blindness. See D. CAvERs, supra note
21, at 9. He later explained this essay as an attempt to mount an attack on "jurisdiction-selecting
rules." D. CAVERS, supra note 3, at 3.
76. A survey of choice of law statutes can be found in Brilmayer, supra note 74, at 424-29.
77. See Ely, supra note 1, at 178-79 (listing authors who adhere to proposition that interests are
designed to "help the locals").
78. Id. at 198 & n.66.
79. See infra text accompanying note 112 (mutuality requirement satisfied by jurisdiction-
selecting rules).
80. See infra Part 1(D).
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so different. The divergence is a direct consequence of the differences be-
tween their foundations. Whenever a law is applied it will work to the
advantage of one party to the litigation and to the disadvantage of the
other. Choice of law at the adjudicative stage is a zero sum game; what
advances the cause of the plaintiff simultaneously imposes costs on the
defendant, and vice versa. This is as true in purely domestic cases as in
conflicts cases. A theory of adjudication that is forward-looking focuses on
one side of this balance, namely the good that can be done and how best to
attain the goal that the law is designed to achieve. In the choice of law
context, this approach results in a focus on whether the benefits that
would be produced by the application of a law are the intended ones, that
is, benefits to local persons. A theory of adjudication that is backward-
looking, by contrast, focuses on whether the parties deserve their treat-
ment, and it must therefore ask about the appropriateness of the place-
ment of burdens. The question is not whether the benefits are intended,
but whether the burdens are justified.
A model of political rights and the modern policy approach to choice of
law are mirror images of one another; the rights analysis looks at burden-
ing links and the policy analysis looks at benefiting links. Using burden-
ing links, the rights analysis divides cases into categories that resemble the
interest analysis categories of true conflicts, false conflicts, and unpro-
vided-for cases. As with interest analysis, some cases are false problems;
these occur when the parties either share a common domicile or hail from
states that have the same substantive law."1 Assume, for instance, that
both parties are Connecticut domiciliaries. Connecticut law must be to the
disadvantage of either the plaintiff or the defendant; whichever it is, that
party has sufficient connection with Connecticut so that his or her rights
are not violated by application of Connecticut law. There is no rights-
based objection because whichever is the aggrieved party, he or she is a
local domiciliary. This reasoning mirrors the interest analysis reasoning
that where both parties are from Connecticut, then Connecticut must have
an interest in having its law applied. The substance of the law need not
be consulted because whether it helps the plaintiff or the defendant, Con-
necticut helps the local.
In cases of mixed domicile, the political rights analysis also results in a
mirror image of interest analysis. Assume that New York law and Con-
necticut law differ and that one party is from New York and the other is
from Connecticut. There are two possible configurations: Either both are
relatively favored by the laws of their respective states or both are disad-
vantaged. Consider first the case in which each party would benefit by
application of his or her home state's law.
81. In this and much of the discussion immediately following, I borrow from John Ely's excellent
treatment. See Ely, supra note 1, at 200-01.
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In interest analysis terminology, this is a true conflict and therefore a
hard case. Each state has a policy reason for applying its own law, be-
cause application of local law would help the local person relative to the
application of the other state's law. Under a rights-based analysis, this
case is indeed a hard case, but the reason is very different. The problem is
not that there are two good connecting links, each of which would justify
application of local law-namely, the link between Connecticut and its
party and the link between New York and its party. Instead, the problem
is that there are no connecting links to justify the burdensome application
of either law. Connecticut lacks a link with the party that would be bur-
dened by its local law, while New York lacks a link with the party that
would be burdened if New York law were applied. Thus, from a political
rights perspective, it seems that the modern theorists are correct about
which cases are simple and which cases are hard; it's just that they ex-
plain their classification in what seems to the rights theorist to be pre-
cisely the wrong way.
Now consider the other possibility: cases of mixed domicile in which
neither party would benefit by the application of his or her own law.
Each party, in other words, would prefer the law of the other party's
home state. An interest analyst would classify this situation as an unpro-
vided-for case because no links rationalize the application of either state's
law. Because policy analysts would be searching for benefiting links
rather than burdening ones, they would view this case as a vacuum. A
rights-based analysis, in contrast, would apply the domiciliary principle
and find two adequate links which would support the application of either
New York law or Connecticut law, since application of either would dis-
advantage only the local person. Neither the modern approach nor the
rights-based domiciliary principle can provide a unique and satisfying
choice of one state's law over the other.
The structure of the problem, then, appears very similar under interest
analysis and a political rights approach; analysis of a case might reveal
either no justifying link, one justifying link, or two justifying links. Under
either approach, the hardest case is the case of mixed domicile in which
each party would benefit from application of his or her own state's law.
Does this mean that a rights analysis founders on the same shoals as gov-
ernmental interest analysis, namely on the existence of true conflicts? Not
necessarily. First, there is a default position. When there is no justification
for either state's intervention, the proper solution is to remain at the status
quo. 2 Moreover, we have not yet exhausted the list of potential justifica-
tions. We must return to our original question, namely what can give a
state the ability to exercise coercive power in a legitimate fashion. So far,
82. The reason would be that no state has a right to disturb the existing distribution. The default
position in Currie's system was to apply forum law. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
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we have investigated only one possible answer to this problem, namely
that the burdened party is a domiciliary or a local corporation. Other pos-
sibilities exist.
B. Territoriality
Territoriality would seem to be an obvious candidate for dealing with
the hard cases. It yields a compromise between giving either party the
benefit of his or her home state's law. Indeed, it may supply an alternative
justification for state authority, not merely a device called in to break ties.
Admittedly, its association with the old-fashioned vested rights approach
has given it something of a bad name, but this association is unnecessary
and misleading. Territoriality need not involve an effort to single out a
unique location where "the rights vest." Nor need we interpret it to re-
quire that the aggrieved party have been personally present within the
state. As an initial matter, we will loosely define it as merely meaning that
the location of events matters for choice of law decisions.
Despite the fact that territoriality is currently out of fashion, there can
be little doubt that territoriality plays some role in a state's right to exer-
cise coercive authority. Regulatory jurisdiction, generally, is pegged to the
local occurrence of events.8 3 Criminal law and taxation depend upon a
nexus with the territory of the state.84 In international law, application of
American statutes depends upon the occurrence of conduct or impact
within the United States.85 In resolving legal problems involving transac-
tions between individuals from different states, the party who stayed at
home seems intuitively more entitled to claim the benefit of local law than
the party that ventured away from home, thereby willingly leaving the
protection of his or her own home state. When in Rome, one does as the
Romans do. Furthermore, one apparently subjects oneself to foreign law
when one causes consequences in another state.
To describe a common intuition is not to give the arguments for why a
particular rule may seem fair, however. Territoriality has not received a
great deal of attention as an explicit assumption.88 Yet well-known treat-
ments of the problem of political obligation rest on highly territorial as-
sumptions, sometimes phrased in terms of implicit or "tacit" consent. The
best known is probably that of Locke, who argued that one consented to
the exercise of state authority when one resided or travelled upon a state's
territory.8" This argument should have a very familiar ring to civil proce-
83. See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573
(1986) (commerce clause prohibits regulation of out-of-state transactions).
84. L. BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 12, chs. 11, 13.
85. Id. at 301-14.
86. But see, e.g., M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE ch. 2 (1983).
87. J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 119-21 (J. Gough ed. 1946) (3d ed.
1698).
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dure teachers; it reflects the same assumptions as certain well-known per-
sonal jurisdiction cases.8" Locke's account even matches some of these
cases in detail, such as where he argued that using the state's highways
amounted to consent-the precursor to modern non-resident motorist
statutes!
Despite its familiarity and prestigious associations, this reasoning begs
important questions. Most obviously, this "consent" is usually purely fic-
tional.8 Furthermore, theories of tacit consent assume almost exactly
what they set out to prove. Could England decide to infer tacit consent to
English authority from an individual's French residence or use of the
French highways? Presumably not. Allowing England to do so would al-
low it to assume authority over persons everywhere.90 Indeed, even if
England were to notify the world in advance that it would infer tacit con-
sent to the laws of England from entry into France, popular expectation
that England would do this (if it could somehow find the means) would
not make assertion of English authority legitimate.
There are limits on what the state may infer, and these limits are them-
selves territorial. England may infer tacit consent from the act of walking
upon English soil only because England has sovereign authority over Eng-
lish territory. It was precisely such difficulties with theories of tacit con-
sent that led the Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton 9l to reject implied consent as a basis of adjudicative jurisdiction.
Under International Shoe, the forum may only infer consent when doing
so would be fair; the implied consent theory adds nothing to the calculus,
and one is better off to proceed directly to the fairness question and skip
all discussion of consent. 2
Another attempt to explain territoriality might focus on the benefits
that an individual receives upon initiating purposeful contact with the
state.9 Submission to state authority is then something of a quid pro quo.
This argument, also, surfaces in judicial opinions: purposeful behavior
and receipt of benefits have been central elements in the Supreme Court's
personal jurisdiction analysis. The argument seems consistent with liberal
assumptions that political obligations should be assumed by individuals
voluntarily, rather than thrust upon the unwilling."4 But the problem of
circularity is not solved. Whether phrased in terms of voluntary assump-
tion of obligations or express or tacit consent, what remains unexplained
88. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (upholding non-resident motorist statute
based on implicit consent).
89. This has not gone unnoticed in the personal jurisdiction literature. Stein, supra note 1, at 735.
90. L. BRILMAYER, supra note 64, at 62.
91. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
92. Id. at 316.
93. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). Compare A. SIMMONS, supra note 65, at
107-08 with Stein, supra note 1, at 735-36.
94. A. SIMMONS, supra note 65, at 69 (arguing that consent theory is liberal theory because it
protects freedom to choose).
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is the fact that a state apparently may impose conditions upon some types
of voluntary behavior but not others. The attachment of conditions pre-
supposes that the state already has power over an individual, namely the
power to attach certain conditions to the individual's actions. Further-
more, only voluntary actions that are in some way connected to the state's
territory impose obligations. Behaving voluntarily towards France does
not typically obligate one towards England. 5
Territoriality cannot be fully explained in terms of the standard argu-
ments about consent, voluntary behavior, or receipt of benefits, because
these arguments are themselves based on territorial assumptions. The
problem is that the state cannot simply bootstrap itself into authority over
an individual. 6 It is almost impossible for some entity with no pre-
existing authority to justify assertions of political authority over an indi-
vidual. If the justification is based upon the exchange of a quid pro quo,
then where does the state obtain this "quid" to exchange? How can it
explain its alleged ability to withhold benefits absent the individual's as-
sumption of political obligation when the state has not already been
shown to possess some such authority? As critics of law and economics
have long argued, arguments based upon the parties' consent depend upon
a prior assignment of entitlements.9
The modern choice of law theorists should not be too quick to celebrate
the obvious difficulties of territoriality. To a certain extent, territoriality
must simply be taken as axiomatic for choice of law purposes. Indeed, like
the vested rights approach, modern policy analysis is permeated with ter-
ritorial assumptions. Not only is it well accepted that conduct-regulating
norms operate territorially,9" but the foundational emphasis on the wel-
95. L. BRILMAYER, supra note 64, at 66-68. See also K. GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW
AND MORALITY 124-27 (1987) (criticizing "fair play" argument).
96. A state is in something of a catch-22. If it receives consent without promising something in
return, then it is subject to the charge that the "bargain" is too one-sided to be fair. On the other
hand, if it promises something in exchange, the question arises of the source of the initial power over
that asset which enables the state to have a right to withhold it from individuals. This issue is dis-
cussed at greater length in Brilmayer, Contract, Consent, and Territory, 74 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1989)
(forthcoming).
97. See, e.g., J. COLEMAN, supra note 52, at 109. One response is that the "contract" is not with
the state, per se, but with the citizens of the state. A group of individuals have a social contract with
one another, and their grant of authority to the state bestows upon it some assets or power that can be
"traded" to other individuals not yet obligated to obey. Whatever the merits of such an explanation, it
cannot avoid the reliance upon territorial presuppositions. Once the initial group members attempt to
impose the state's will on persons who were not original signatories, they must do so in territorial
ways. The community is still defined by its territorial scope. Persons become members of the commu-
nity by being born there, or fall under the sway of its authority by coming onto its land. Original
signatories might be allowed to terminate political obligations by leaving the state to reside elsewhere.
Indeed, the domiciliary principle itself rests upon territorial assumptions; territory defines who is in
the voting pool. No state could subject a person to its authority by simply extending that person an
opportunity to participate in its elections. The forced exchange of a right to vote for the obligation to
obey only works with those already committed to the state territorially, whether by domicile or
residence.
98. See generally Brilmayer, supra note 74, although, as John Ely notes, interest analysts often
forget or brush aside their own proviso. Ely, supra note 1, at 194 & n.59.
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fare of local residents reflects territorial assumptions. 9 Who else could
comprise the group that (according to modern policy analysis) is to be
benefited, besides those domiciled within the state? The consequences that
a statute is designed to bring about or prevent, by hypothesis, are those
experienced locally. Clearly there is no way to formulate a choice of law
regime other than to found it upon territorial assumptions of some sort.
Nor should there be, despite occasional hints to the contrary.100 State lines
are all that distinguish one state from another, and the people of one state
from another. Choice of law necessarily turns upon the contacts between
the controversy and the various states.
What differentiates the rights-based approach to choice of law from the
modern policy approach is not territoriality, but rather territory's philo-
sophical treatment, for the rights-based approach treats territory as part of
a deontological justification, while policy analysis treats territory as part
of a consequentialist justification. A political rights analysis asks whether
an individual's connections with a state are such as to make it fair to
impose upon him or her the state's conception of substantive justice. A
policy or interests approach asks how to promote the most desirable state
of affairs within a state's territory, with desirability defined in terms of
the state's substantive preferences. The dispute between the two methods
is not over the importance of territory, but over what use to make of terri-
torial assumptions within the competing jurisprudential frameworks.
Given that consequentialist choice of law reasoning also relies on terri-
toriality, one must ask how a rights-based account of territoriality would
be distinctive. At this point, the importance of arguments about express
consent, tacit consent, and purposeful action becomes explicit. If the point
of a rights-based account is to protect the parties' rights-to treat the par-
ties as they deserve-then a party's volitional affiliations with the state are
clearly relevant.
99. See generally Ely, supra note 1.
100. It is not clear that it was ever seriously suggested that territorial connections can be ignored,
though Justice Steven's concurrence in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320 (1981) comes
close. Stevens interpreted fairness as being violated if the rule discriminated against nonresidents, if it
was a dramatic departure from the rule in force in other states, or if the rule was substantively unfair.
Only the first of these has any interstate aspects at all-and it clearly does not require territorial
connections in the usual sense.
The oddness of Stevens' interpretation of fairness is that on the facts of that case, factor two (at
least) and maybe factor three would prohibit application of the distinctive Wisconsin law on the
Allstate facts, though Wisconsin was the state where the accident occurred and where all the parties
were domiciled at the time.
Indeed, factor two would prohibit any state from adopting substantive rules even for purely domes-
tic purposes that were substantively different from those of other states. One suspects that Justice
Stevens must have had some notion of territorial connections in mind.
Of course, to say that territoriality matters is not to say that states have complete and dictatorial
powers within their own territories. This is particularly true in our federal system, where the states
lack many of the attributes of sovereign states. A state cannot, for example, control immigration from
other states. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1941). This suggests that a state may also
not impose unreasonable conditions upon entry, such as by requiring that an individual obey forum
law while present in other states.
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Where the state's connection with the aggrieved individual is that the
individual is domiciled in the state, this connection need not be purposeful
or deliberate. Some persons take the initiative to choose their own domi-
ciles, but others are "passively" domiciled in a state simply by having
been born there. 1' Domiciliaries are also connected, however, by their
opportunity to vote. Since non-domiciliaries lack the opportunity to par-
ticipate in electoral processes, some sort of purposeful action towards the
territory by the individual is necessary to justify the exertion of state au-
thority. Absent such a volitional act, there would be no way at all to influ-
ence the legal norms that governed one's behavior.
There are, in short, two ways to influence the political decisions that
govern one's life, namely voice and exit.1°2 In this context, voice is ex ante
influence while exit (or entrance) is ex post. Voice means input into the
decision before it is made, while the exit option allows one to choose
among alternative pre-existing legal schemes. The affiliation between a
state and non-domiciliaries must be purposeful to assure a minimal level
of individual control over the legal norms to which the individual will be
subjected.
This prompts one serious criticism of the vested rights approach from a
political rights-based perspective. Because it focused on particular territo-
rial connecting factors divorced from consideration of political rights, the
vested rights approach sometimes called for application of the law of a
state with which the complaining party had no voluntary connection. As-
sume, for example, that a buyer and seller negotiate the major portion of
a contract in their common home state. The contract is to be performed
there as well, but before accepting the deal the buyer travels to another
state (chosen for its law advantageous to buyers), and while in that state
drops the acceptance into the mailbox. Under First Restatement rules, the
contract would be subject to the law of that second state because that is
where the acceptance was mailed."0 3
The usual criticism of this First Restatement analysis would be that
this is completely arbitrary.' 0 ' Perhaps it is. But note that there is another
objection, based upon the parties' political rights. The seller, in this scena-
rio, has no voluntary affiliation with the second state at all; that state was
chosen unilaterally by the buyer and it therefore has no right to impose its
law upon the seller. l05 Such difficulties arise in virtually every area of the
101. One can acquire a domicile not only by choice but also automatically, such as by being born
or through the operation of law. See generally E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 66, at 197-98.
102. Cf. A. HIRSCHMAN, ExiT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
103. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 326.
104. B. CURRIE, supra note 2, at 86-87.
105. An interesting argument would be that if the state is applying its own choice of law rules to
a local party, then there is no unfairness since it is local authority that subjects the party to the
foreign law. While this is not the appropriate place to digress upon this possibility, which resembles
the "local law" approach of Cook, see W. COOK, supra note 20, at 26, it should be noted that often
the forum is not the aggrieved party's home state. It is, instead, a foreign court with which the com-
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First Restatement's rules, which characteristically fail to relate the chosen
territorial connecting factor to the purposeful action of the party pro-
testing application of local law. 06
For this reason, the new rights-based approach differs from the vested
rights theory not only in foundation but in practice as well. Territoriality,
under the aspects of the rights-based approach already described, does not
mean that a state can simply assign a particular territorial factor talis-
manic significance, even if that factor represents the mythical "last act" of
vested rights fame. The territorial factor that is chosen must reflect the
aggrieved party's voluntary submission to the law that is chosen.
C. Mutuality
We have described at least two different theories for the fair application
of state law. Even within one theory (territoriality), more than one state
may have adequate connections with a dispute. A rights-based approach
leaves open a wide range of permissible options. It would seem to be the
rare case in which analysis of rights would narrow the range of possibili-
ties and leave only a single fair application of one state's law. The forum
is left with a choice that must be made on some other basis than the
parties' negative political rights.
Does fairness have anything further to say about this choice? Is the
subject exhausted once one concludes that the state whose law is applied
has enough connections to fairly exercise political authority? On closer
examination, there may be more to rights than simply viewing in isolation
the connections between the individual and the state whose law is chosen.
Different conceptions of political fairness will obviously give rise to differ-
ent additional principles, but one that comes to mind involves assessing the
fairness of the overall pattern of choices made by the choice of law rule
(or method, or approach). This is not a simple question of a negative right
to be left alone, in the sense described above, but of a right to fair treat-
ment, even by a politically authoritative state.107
An analogy will illustrate the difference between assessing the individ-
ual fairness of an action and assessing the overall pattern of results. Con-
trast the concerns of substantive constitutional protections such as the
First Amendment with distributional provisions such as the equal protec-
tion clause. Under the requirement of equal protection, one need not ar-
gue that some benefit is unconditionally guaranteed to an individual. In
isolation, the conclusion might be that the individual's rights have not
plaining party has little connection. Thus, it can only rarely be argued that the complaining party is
subject to foreign law by virtue of the party's home state choice of law rules.
106. The tort rules of the First Restatement, for example, asked only where the injury occurred;
the plaintiff might purchase a defective good, take it to some distant state, and suffer injury there. See,
e.g., Alabama Great S.R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892).
107. See supra note 11.
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been violated because the individual had no constitutional right to the ben-
efit in the first place. This does not, however, answer the question
whether the overall distribution of benefits is fair, which is the question
posed by equal protection analysis. One argues instead that if the benefit
is given to individual A, then it must also be given to individual B.
Similar issues arise in choice of law. Even though there may be no
individual guarantee that a party not be subject to the law of state A,
perhaps he or she nonetheless should not be subject to the law of state A,
because this treatment would compare unfavorably either with that re-
ceived by other people or with the way that same individual might be
treated in other cases. If one imagines an extreme example of distribu-
tional unfairness, one can see how a choice of law rule might be unfair
even though the end result was the application of a law that had adequate
connections with the parties under the aspects of the rights-based ap-
proach already described. Assume that the forum adopts a choice of law
rule that says, "First identify all of the state laws that could be applied
without violating any of the parties' negative political rights, and then
apply the one that is the most advantageous to the local person and disad-
vantageous to the foreign person." While objection to this rule cannot be
based upon the negative claims of right that we have outlined, it certainly
seems unfair nonetheless.
The problem with the hypothesized rule is that it imposes the burdens
of a substantive rule on people without allowing them the corresponding
benefits. In the usual domestic context, an individual would expect to ex-
perience both the benefits and the costs of a rule over the long run. Sub-
stantive rules, in other words, are actuarially fair,108 because an individual
108. While usually rules that are actuarially fair also are both jurisdiction-selecting and pass the
mutuality test, in theory these three things are slightly different. The relationship between actuarial
fairness and mutuality is as follows: A rule might be actuarially fair if it was sometimes loaded
against one party and sometimes loaded against the other, so long as the bias evened out over the long
run. For example, it would be actuarially fair to choose the rule that favored the younger of two
parties to the litigation, so long as it was just as likely that one's opponent would be older as younger.
Such a rule would not pass the mutuality test, however, because in any particular case the rule would
not be as likely to help the particular party as to hurt him or her. Thus, an individual would not be
held to the burdens of a rule except in situations where it could help him or her if the tables were
turned.
The test of mutuality therefore more nearly resembles the old-fashioned idea that certain rules are
jurisdiction-selecting. A rule is jurisdiction-selecting when the choice of which substantive rule to
apply does not depend upon the content of the competing substantive rules. If the choice does not
depend upon content, then it does not depend upon the outcome that the rule would dictate if applied.
Thus, if the choice of law rule is jurisdiction-selecting, the probability of a particular substantive
rule's being applied does not vary depending upon whether the rule helps or hurts a particular party.
I have chosen to suggest a test of mutuality rather than to require that a choice of law rule be
jurisdiction-selecting, because I do not wish to suggest that a judge be completely blind to the contours
of the competing rules, but only that the decision not turn upon which side the rule happens to
benefit. The word jurisdiction-selecting is ambiguous as to whether it requires complete ignorance of
the substantive content of the rules. See infra note 117. If a rule must be completely blind to content
to be jurisdiction-selecting, then this requirement is too restrictive. The test of actuarial fairness is
perhaps not quite restrictive enough, however, as it does not require that the rule be balanced on a
case-by-case basis, but only over the long haul. The mutuality requirement reflects a certain concep-
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is eligible, in theory, to gain as much by application of the rule as he or
she would lose if the tables were turned. To make a class of individuals
ineligible to receive the benefits under a rule, while allowing the rule's
burdens to be imposed upon them, results in an actuarial imbalance, be-
cause over the long run the rule cannot be expected to work out evenly.' 09
The point is not merely a comparison of how insiders and outsiders are
treated, although these are also problems of a distributional type.' 10
Rather, the problem is that of a single individual and his or her overall
expectation of benefits and burdens." 1
Choice of law systems that are actuarially out of balance have a redis-
tributive effect; they cannot be explained purely in terms of corrective jus-
tice.1 2 The probability of some particular substantive rule's applicability
varies according to whether the rule works to the benefit or to the detri-
ment of the particular litigant. Under a choice of law method in which it
is not legally relevant whether an individual stands to benefit, these
probabilities are, formally at least, identical. Rules that are jurisdiction-
selecting, in the old-fashioned sense, are actuarially balanced because
whether the rule is applied does not depend upon the content of the rule,
and therefore is independent of whether the content of the rule helps or
hurts a particular party.
The domiciliary principle of our new rights-based approach, however,
is not actuarially balanced, since it allows the application of a state's law
when it burdens a local citizen but does not automatically allow applica-
tion of the same law when it would work to a citizen's benefit. The only
tion of impartiality, namely that the outcome of a particular case not be biased in favor of one party
over the other. Whether a particular rule of substantive law applies in a case does not depend upon
whom it benefits and whom it burdens.
Mutuality also possesses the following attractive characteristic. When a rule's applicability does not
depend upon whom it benefits, then the state's claim to apply its law does not turn on whether the
other state's law is more favorable or less favorable to recovery. Assume that state A's rule is very
favorable to defendants, state C's law is very favorable to plaintiffs, and state B's law falls somewhere
in between. Then if the applicability of the B law turns on whether it benefits some one of the parties,
then its applicability turns on whether it is being compared to the law of state A or state C. If state B
has adequate connections with both the parties to the litigation, then the claim to apply B law does
not stand or fall depending on which other state's law it is being compared to.
109. Informal substantive imbalance is possible where the rule works to the advantage of one class
of society (say, creditors) and to the detriment of another (debtors). The imbalance occurs where an
individual expects to be a debtor more often than the creditor, or vice versa. The rule is formally
balanced, but as a practical matter, will not work out that way. Without denigrating the importance
of such bias, one might simply note that the situation that we are addressing is not even formally
balanced.
110. For example, a rule would be imbalanced if it treated some outsiders differently from others,
redistributing wealth (for instance) from Alaskans to Arizonans.
111. This reasoning about balance is not consequentialist, even though it turns on the likely run
of events over a period of time, as the rule is applied in a series of cases. First, the emphasis is not on
overall consequences, but rather on the expected potential impact on the aggrieved party. The impact
of the balanced rule on other people is not a relevant consideration. Second, the essence of the claim is
for treatment that is intrinsically fair, because it offers the aggrieved party as much opportunity for
benefit as for burden. This is no more a consequentialist argument than any other claim for equal
distribution.
112. On the difference between redistributive and corrective justice, see supra note 39.
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Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law
instances in which a local rule would be applied to a citizen's benefit
would be when some other basis for state authority existed; e.g., the bur-
dened party was also a citizen. The definition of state interests in interest
analysis is likewise not actuarially balanced, as it takes into account
whether the benefit that the substantive rule is designed to achieve will
fall into the hands of a local person.
Actuarial balance is desirable, because choice of law seems an unprom-
ising area of law in which to effect wealth redistribution. In the interstate
arena, a state's authority is at its most tenuous. However, if choice of law
rules are to have redistributive consequences, at least they are better di-
rected against insiders than outsiders. This is the effect of the domiciliary
principle, because the state is granted the right to coerce its own people or
business entities by imposing burdens upon them. Ideally, a choice of law
rule would be actuarially balanced; however, a state's choice to redistrib-
ute wealth away from its own people is not automatically illegitimate.
Such a law is unnecessarily generous, but so long as the burdens are self-
imposed, the state may legitimately choose to do so. The decision-maker
imposing such a rule should be certain, however, that the costs are consid-
ered and found to be acceptable.
An example of such redistribution occurs in current choice between
American state tort law and foreign tort law. In cases with international
elements, American pro-recovery law has sometimes been applied to
American defendants who injure foreigners abroad."' American manufac-
turers are thereby held to the higher standards of liability, even though
they cannot necessarily rely upon American law when it is to their advan-
tage, since foreign individuals cannot be sued in the United States nor
held to U.S. law. As one might expect, this situation is politically unpopu-
lar and has brought about calls for legislative reform." 4 A state might
understandably hesitate to adopt a choice of law rule such as the domicili-
ary principle because it would systematically work to the disadvantage of
local persons. Arguably, a state's doing so is politically fair, in the sense
discussed above, because it is imposing the costs on its own people. And
whether to adopt such a substantively unfair rule is no different from the
question of whether to adopt a rule of torts or contracts that is substan-
tively unfair. But for precisely that reason, such a choice of law regime is
not ideal. Adoption of such a regime should be a carefully considered
choice, even if only local persons are disadvantaged.
To implement the notion of actuarial fairness, one might want to follow
113. For example, if an American corporation injures someone abroad, the foreign plaintiff is
likely to have a choice between suing at home (if that legal rule is advantageous) or, more likely, suing
under United States tort law within the U.S. Application of American law has a redistributive effect
because it usually would not be fairly applicable to the foreigner's disadvantage.
114. See S. 1996, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1, 133 CONG. REC. S18,806 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1987);
H.R. 3662, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1, 133 CONG. REc. H10,659 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1987).
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a general principle of mutuality.115 Mutuality would require that the sub-
stantive rule not be applied to an individual's detriment unless the indi-
vidual would be eligible to receive the benefits if the tables were turned.
This idea of "mutuality" resembles the concept of mutuality of estoppel in
the context of judgments enforcement.1 " Mutuality prohibits obviously
unbalanced rules such as "choose the law that favors the local party."
More subtly, it requires a judge to inquire into whether the law could
fairly be applied to both parties, rather than simply whether it can fairly
be applied to the aggrieved individual.
Jurisdiction-selecting rules satisfy mutuality because they do not de-
pend upon the content of the substantive rule selected in the sense of
which party will benefit. The content of the substantive rule may matter
insofar as it describes relevant territorial factors, but one need not know
whether it favors the plaintiff or the defendant. 17 A jurisdiction-selecting
rule will satisfy the mutuality requirement while simultaneously protect-
ing political rights when it selects a state that has adequate connections
with both parties. In such cases, one can select that state's law in the
jurisdiction-selecting way-that is, without knowing what result the law,
once examined, will dictate.
The ability to satisfy mutuality while respecting political rights may in
fact be the distinguishing feature of the most successful applications of the
old-fashioned territorial rules. Most territorial rules were adopted at a
time when a greater proportion of cases, such as actions in tort or con-
tract, involved face-to-face transactions or interactions. Under such cir-
cumstances, one could be relatively certain that the transaction could be
assigned a location such that the rights "vested" in a state with which
both parties had connections. That assignment might very well be arbi-
trary, in that other equally relevant events might have occurred in other
states, yet at least a law was selected that could be applied without unfair-
ness to either party. Today, however, it is much more common for busi-
ness deals to be entered into over the phone, for products liability cases to
be brought against defendants from a distant state, and for the acquisition
of stock to be made through interstate tender offers. When transactions
are spread out across a number of states, such a territorial assignment not
only might be more arbitrary but also might be more likely to violate one
115. This rule of mutuality is not, mathematically speaking, the only way to actuarially balance a
choice of law rule. See supra note 108.
116. The mutuality rule says that a party may take advantage of a prior ruling only if he or she
would have been bound had the ruling gone the other way. See, e.g., F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL
PROCEDURE §§ 11.24-11.25, at 631-37 (3d ed. 1985). The requirement of mutuality is less defensible
in the context of res judicata than in choice of law, because the losing party was involved in the first
suit, and therefore was able to present his or her case.
117. For example, a choice of law rule might treat the scope of a contracts rule differently from a
torts rule (they would be triggered by location of different events) and thus depend upon the content
of the substantive rule. Whether a rule ceases for that reason to be jurisdiction-selecting is unclear,
given the ambiguities of present usage. See supra note 108.
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Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law
or more party's rights. The arbitrariness stems from the fact that one can-
not assume that the contract is negotiated, signed, and performed in the
same location; to choose one factor over the others in determining a loca-
tion seems hard to defend. The potential violation of rights stems from the
possibility that one of the parties may have little or no contact with the
state where the contract was actually formed, in the technical sense of
offer and acceptance. Under modern conditions, Bealean rules are increas-
ingly unlikely to satisfy both mutuality and negative rights.
The familiar territorial vested rights regimes would not be the only
conceivable way to achieve the goal of both mutuality and protection of
negative rights. Savigny pioneered a choice of law theory based on the
"seat of the relationship" of the parties, which tried to assign a situs to the
parties' legal transactions. While this often had consequences similar to
vested-rights-style territoriality, " 8 the systems were far from identical.
The "center of gravity" approach119 is similar to Savigny's. By searching
for the seat of the relationship or the center of gravity, one would with
any luck find a state with which both parties were connected, because this
would be a state where the parties' activities intersected. As with the
vested rights approach, Savigny's system achieved the goals of political
fairness and mutuality better in those days where most transactions in-
volved at least some face-to-face dealings. Given modern communications
technology, the existence of some relatively direct prior dealings between
the parties can no longer be taken for granted.
D. Interest Analysis and Fairness
We have made mention at several points of the defects of the vested
rights theory from a political rights-based perspective. We have also dis-
cussed the ways in which modern policy analysis differs from the rights-
based approach at the foundational level. But as our discussion of the
vested rights theory also shows, it is possible for a choice of law system to
have strengths that were not deliberately planned. 2 At this point, one
might well ask how well the modern policy analysis fares in practice at
the protection of political rights, however little it intends such protection.
First, and most obviously, the fact that interest analysis does not expli-
citly inquire into fairness allows it to apply the law of a state which has
no political relationship with the aggrieved party. By focusing on the ben-
efits bestowed by the rule's application, interest analysis fails to require
justification for the burdens that it imposes. In this respect, it is in the
118. F. VON SAVIGNY, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (1869) (solution to conflicts cases
turns on "ascertain[ing] for every legal relation (case) that law to which, in its proper nature, it
belongs or is subject"); id. at 94-95 (specifying how to discover seat of legal relation).
119. Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 160-61, 124 N.E.2d 99, 101-02 (1954) (discussing 'center of
gravity' or 'grouping of contacts' approach).
120. See supra text accompanying note 117-19.
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same boat as the vested rights theory. This difficulty arises, however, only
in true conflict and unprovided-for cases. It does not arise in false conflict
cases because, as John Ely has demonstrated, these cases involve situations
where the parties share a common domicile or hail from states with iden-
tical laws on the issue in question.1 1 False conflict cases result in no un-
fairness because the aggrieved party is subject to the law of his or her own
home state. These conditions satisfy the domiciliary test.1"2 Surprisingly
and virtually by coincidence-given its foundational differences-interest
analysis thereby satisfies the political rights test on an important subset of
disputes.
True conflicts and unprovided-for cases involve individuals from differ-
ent states. Whether the modern approaches violate political rights in these
cases depends upon whether one accepts Currie's solution to the true con-
flict and unprovided-for cases, or whether one seeks some other solution.
Currie argued at one point that one should simply apply forum law." 3
But it is not at all clear that the forum can fairly apply its law to any case
before it. First, there are many ways of obtaining personal jurisdiction,
and not all of them answer the fairness question posed by choice of law.
One might be subjected to jurisdiction, for example, because one was
"tagged" while simply passing through.1 24 Perhaps jurisdiction based
upon mere presence should be considered fundamentally unfair and done
away with as a matter of constitutional law. Arguably, once this is done
the forum should automatically be allowed to apply its own law. Whether
or not the wisdom of this proposal will ultimately be recognized, however,
there remains the question of what we should do with choice of law in the
meantime.
Moreover, there are ways of getting personal jurisdiction besides "tag-
ging" which are less obviously unfair, yet may present the same fairness
problem for a rights-sensitive choice of law theory. A defendant might
consent to jurisdiction because the locale is not an inconvenient place to
litigate: Perhaps it is reasonably close by and the defendant has access to
good legal counsel there. Consent might occur ex ante, by contractual pro-
vision, or after the litigation is filed. Why should this consent automati-
cally extend to choice of law as well? Alternately, one could unwittingly
waive one's right to object to personal jurisdiction by failing to raise the
issue at the right time. This seems eminently sensible and undoubtedly
121. See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.
122. This analysis is complicated only slightly where conduct-regulating policies are taken into
account. As we noted earlier, interest analysts recognized such territorial contacts in theory but usu-
ally downplayed them in practice. See supra text accompanying note 74. A false conflict might arise
out of an unprovided-for case plus a conduct-regulating factor; but if the aggrieved party acted within
the state, then he or she could not complain about applications of local law and thus 'there would be
no unfairness.
123. B. CURRIE, supra note 2, at 184.
124. See Brilmayer, A General Look, supra note 73, at 748-55.
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Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law
constitutional from the point of view of personal jurisdiction doctrine, but
says nothing about whether the forum ought to be allowed automatically
to apply its own law.
If we conclude that the mere fact that a state is the forum does not
automatically give it the right to apply local law, then one must reject
Currie's solution to the true conflict and unprovided-for cases on the
grounds that applying forum law may violate one of the parties' rights.
The other potential problem with Currie's system of interest analysis is
whether it meets the requirement of actuarial fairness. It has been noted
that the definition of state interests upon which Currie relied has the ef-
fect of discriminating against nonresidents because his idea of state inter-
ests did not recognize an interest in helping outsiders. 2 5 This aspects of
"interest" seems at first to create a possibility of loading the choice of law
process against outsiders, because outsiders are held to the burdens of lo-
cal law whenever the state has an interest in applying its law, but there is
no corresponding interest in applying local law to their benefit.
The definition of interests that Currie prescribed does indeed have this
characteristic. The method as a whole, however, avoids this consequence if
consistently applied,"2" because the concept of an interest turns out not to
be necessary to the application of a state's law. It is perfectly possible to
apply local law even when the state has no "interest," because forum law
will apply unless both parties are from a state that has the different rule.
That is, although the existence of an "interest" turns on who is benefited,
application of a state's law does not turn on whether there is an interest.
The probability of being benefited by local law, therefore, is the same as
the probability of being burdened by it, because the probability of forum
law not being applied does not depend upon whether it is helpful or
harmful; all it depends upon is whether one happens to be transacting
with an individual from a state with the same law. Modem policy analy-
sis, in other words, passes the mutuality test, but only by coincidence;
local law is sometimes applied even when there is no "interest." For this
reason, it appears that as a method, Currie's version of policy analysis is
jurisdiction-selecting-that is, whether a law applies does not depend
upon its content.
This conclusion is sufficiently startling that it warrants a closer look.
Assume that there are two states, the forum, F, and the alternative state,
A. There are four possible alternative patterns of affiliation of the two
parties, plaintiff, P, and defendant, D:
125. Ely, supra note 1.
126. It isn't always applied consistently, however. For example, there is a tendency to find "inter-
ests" in penalizing corporations but to be less willing to find such interests in protecting them. Note,
Interest Analysis Applied to Corporations: The Unprincipled Use of a Choice of Law Method, 98
YALE L.J. 597, 603-609, 614-15 & n.98 (1989) (authored by J. Goldsmith).
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Cases 1 and 4 are cases of common domicile, while cases 2 and 3 are cases
of different domicile.
Now, a choice of law case arises because the states' laws differ. In vari-
ation I, assume that F has the pro-plaintiff law and A has the pro-defend-
ant law. The outcomes are as follows:
VARIATION I
F(pro-P) A(pro-D) outcome
Case 1 P,D F
Case 2 P D F
Case 3 D P F
Case 4 P,D A
In case 1, F's law is applied because it is a false conflict; in case 4, A's
law is applied for the same reason. In cases 2 and 3, F's law is applied
because they are a true conflict and an unprovided-for case, respectively.
In variation II, we switch the two laws so that F's law favors defend-
ants and A's law favors plaintiffs. The outcomes are as follows, for rea-
sons that are directly analogous to those in variation I:
VARIATION II
F(pro-D) A(pro-P) outcome
Case 1 PD F
Case 2 P D F
Case 3 D P F
Case 4 P,D A
The important point is that the outcomes are exactly the same as in varia-
tion I. This means that we do not need to know anything about the poli-
cies underlying the two laws to determine which law to apply. The Currie
method is jurisdiction-selecting because it amounts to a command to apply
forum law unless the parties share a common domicile (or come from a
state with identical laws). One need know no more about the content of
F A
Case 1 P,D
Case 2 P D
Case 3 D P
Case 4 P,D
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Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law
the competing rules than one would need to know to apply the First
Restatement.
The only possible exception to these diagrams would be the case in
which a territorially-triggered conduct-regulating rule was present. Such a
rule would increase the number of "interests" if it were designed to deter
or encourage conduct within the state and the events occurred there.
While such an increase has no effect on true conflicts (which are decided
according to forum law), it will turn some false conflicts into true conflicts
and some unprovided-for cases into false conflicts. 117 But the irony of this
is that the only way to make the result turn on anything other than shared
domicile is to make some rather old-fashioned territorialist assumptions
about the concern of states with regulating activities occurring within their
territories-hardly the sort of assumption designed to warm the modern
policy theorists' hearts.
Interest analysis therefore satisfies the test of political fairness in sur-
prising ways. It satifies the mutuality requirement because on close exam-
ination the method turns out to be jurisdiction-selecting. And in false con-
flict cases it also satisfies the requirements of negative political
rights-although the reason is that the burdened party is a local, which is
quite coincidental to policy analysis. The method does not necessarily sat-
isfy negative political rights where the forum applies its law to mixed
domicile cases, since there is no guarantee of an adequate connection be-
tween the forum and the aggrieved litigant. A fairer solution to unpro-
vided-for and true conflict cases, therefore, is to apply the law of some
state with adequate territorial connections to both parties.
127. For example, in variation I, where the forum has a pro-plaintiff policy and the alternative
state has a pro-defendant policy, adding a territorial factor brings about two further variations, de-
pending on whether it is an event in state F or in state A.
VARIATION IA: EVENT IN F
F(pro-P) A(pro-D) outcome
Case 1 P,DT F
Case 2 P,T D F
Case 3 D,T P F
Case 4 T PD F
VARIATION IB: EVENT IN A
F(pro-P) A(pro-D) outcome
Case I P,D T F
Case 2 P DT F
Case 3 D P,T A
Case 4 P,D,T A
Thus, the addition of the territorial, conduct-regulating interest alters the result in case 4 under varia-
tion IA and in case 3 under variation 1B.
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III. CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS AN IDEAL CHOICE OF LAW APPROACH
While these observations do not dictate a unique choice of law on all
occasions, they indicate that limits should be placed on what a state should
feel entitled to do in pursuit of state policy. These rights-based limits are
grounded in the observation that a state must be able to justify the bur-
dens that it imposes, as well as to explain the benefits that it seeks to
achieve, when it applies its law. A rights-based theory consists of two
related parts. First, it must specify what rights are and why they matter.
The theory of rights developed in Part I of this article is different from
Joseph Beale's, because the rights are not vested substantive rights but
political rights. The justification for imposing burdens is not that a court
must help enforce the pre-existing legal rights that the parties bring into
the forum from other states, but that the state whose law is applied may
fairly use this case to further local policy. Second, a rights-based theory
must give some guidance about what rights exist. For Joseph Beale, this
meant elaborating territorialist rules. For a political rights model, this
means defining the circumstances in which interstate political authority
may legitimately be applied. Part II of this article sets out a basic outline.
A state law of choice of law that took seriously the notions of political
rights and fairness would address the following questions. First and fore-
most, what is the connection between the state and the party protesting
the application of state law? There could be an adequate connection
where the party is a local domiciliary, has consented to application of local
law, or has voluntarily affiliated with the state by engaging in local activi-
ties or conduct with foreseeable legal consequences. Satisfaction of any of
these alternatives must be gauged by reference to appropriate assumptions
of territorial sovereignty. Second, what is the connection between the state
and the individual who stands to benefit? Is there the sort of connection
that would allow application of local law if the tables were turned and he
or she thus stood to lose? If not, how can the state justify the redistributive
impact? From a number of perspectives, the most attractive solution
would be to select the law of a state with connections to both parties. A
rule which chooses the state of common domicile satisfies the principle of
mutuality; so does a rule choosing a state in which the parties have had
face-to-face transactions.
What is perhaps the most surprising consequence of this analysis is the
extent to which existing theories meet these standards, purely by inadver-
tence. Vested rights theory did not set out to meet the test of mutuality,
yet because its rules are jurisdiction-selecting, they do have that character-
istic. Even more surprising, interest analysis turns out to adhere to mutu-
ality as well, because the concept of an interest turns out to be less central
to the analysis than it first appears. Both theories fail most prominently in
their lack of concern for the sort of purposeful conduct that makes submis-
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sion to state authority fair; but often, personal jurisdiction by coincidence
supplies the missing element. If it were not for these coincidences, would
we have tolerated these approaches this long?
Whatever the unexpected advantages of vested rights and policy analy-
sis, their protection of political rights is too haphazard. On some occa-
sions, they simply fail to protect these rights at all. "Rights" is a meaning-
ful concept for choice of law analysis, and it is important to frame choice
of law analysis in these terms. Regardless of the specific contours that a
rights-based analysis might take-whether it analyzes rights in territorial
or in domiciliary terms-"rights" should not be allowed to slip into choice
of law obscurity. The obligation to treat litigants fairly-to protect
rights-is an obligation of state judges formulating state law as well as
judges faced with constitutional challenges. Our jurisprudential tradition
of insistence on fairness to the parties is important even in this post-realist
world.
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